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ABSTRACT
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, CONTESTED:
THE ALLIED STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY
by Matthew David Monroe
December 2011
Utilizing monthly reports and correspondence of civil rights organizations, in
addition to newspaper coverage, oral histories, and memoirs, this study shows that a
grassroots, community-driven movement mobilized in Mississippi’s capital to challenge
institutionalized discrimination. Yet, racial identity did not dictate exclusively how
White and Black Mississippians responded to the unfolding Civil Rights Movement.
Conflicting and shifting motivations shaped the nature, extent, and pace by which Blacks
and Whites challenged or protected status quo discrimination. The Jackson Movement
began as early as 1955 and sustained protest activity into the 1960s. By the summer of
1965, Jackson’s Black community secured most of its original demands for
nondiscriminatory service and employment, but competing socioeconomic interests
increasingly limited the pace of further social change in Jackson and in the broader
Mississippi Movement.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I love my children and I love my wife with all my heart….and I would die,
and die gladly, if that would make a better life for them.
---NAACP Field Secretary Medgar Evers, June 7, 1963—assassinated five
days later

Historian Harvard Sitkoff suggests that, by the twentieth century, institutionalized
discrimination in the United States “had undermined the nation’s democratic institutions
for nearly two hundred years.” 1 Americans had failed to uphold the original republican
ideal of unfettered liberty as consecrated within the Constitution and as a result, argues
Historian Chana Kai Lee, the twentieth century Civil Rights Movement and its
subsequent evolution into the Black Power Movement in the United States represented a
“fight for political and economic freedom” or, put another way, an effort by black
Americans to exercise meaningful control over their economic and political destinies
without impediment.2 Since Africans had arrived in colonial America as indentured
servants and slaves during the mid-sixteenth century, whites relegated them to
substandard housing, few opportunities to earn more than a subsistence living, unequal
social privileges, and second-class citizenship. With few exceptions, white Americans
justified this discrimination through a common perception that blacks were biologically,
socially, and culturally inferior.
By the mid-twentieth century, institutionalized discrimination continued unabated
throughout the United States, but unlike the rest of the nation, the South maintained a
1

Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954-1992, revised (New
York: Hill & Wang, 1993), viii.
2
Chana Kai Lee, For Freedom’s Sake: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2000), ix.
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legal code known as segregation, which created and sustained separate and unequal
public facilities and services for black Americans. White officials barely funded black
schools and limited black access to largely dilapidated public facilities, while white
community members and businesses regularly served black Americans in a
discriminatory manner, designating certain areas for service and refusing to address them
with courtesy titles. Furthermore, Chana Kai Lee explains convincingly that
institutionalized discrimination facilitated a disturbing, yet relatively common problem,
of “sexualized racial violence” that helped to reinforce a culture of white privilege and
black powerlessness. Because they were often believed to have transgressed social
mores, black women faced an omnipresent threat of molestation and rape with little or no
legal recourse against their attacker while segregationists often took particular interest in
emasculating men by referring to them as “boy,” striking their genitals, or forcing them to
shave and strip nude.3 Also unlike African Americans in other regions of the country,
black southerners lacked voting rights which left them essentially powerless to elect
leaders responsive to their needs. The Civil Rights Movement, in response, represented
part of an extended historical process by which black Americans sought to challenge and
ultimately dismantle institutionalized discrimination. Participants involved in the
freedom struggle worked to secure social justice, or rather, equitable access to viable
housing, employment, food, healthcare, education, and equal protection under the law for
black communities and prompted black Americans to reject commonly-held assumptions
of black inferiority in order to internalize a more positive image of their racial identity.

3

Lee, For Freedom’s Sake, x; see also Danielle McGuire’s At the Dark End of the
Street and Katherine Charron’s Septima Claark: Freedom’s Teacher.
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Until the late 1990s, scholarship on the Civil Rights Movement largely credited
well-known social and political leaders, particularly Martin Luther King, Jr., for sparking
a nation-wide challenge to institutionalized discrimination during the mid-twentieth
century. Yet, a growing collection of scholarship illuminates the importance of
community-driven activism rather than centrally organized leadership for driving civil
rights protest activity. John Dittmer’s Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in
Mississippi and Charles Payne’s I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing
Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle collectively shifted the focus away from
well-recognized historical actors, who nonetheless were vital to the movement, and
instead examined the contributions of “everyday people,” or the multitude of largely
unknown men, women, and children who mobilized and sustained a grassroots struggle
for civil rights in Mississippi. Dittmer and Payne utilize the experiences of grassroots
organizing in impoverished Delta communities as a lens to understand how activism
unfolded throughout the state. They explain how civil rights activists from outside
Mississippi traveled to the state to help local black communities organize themselves for
social, political, and economic uplift. Payne furthermore argues convincingly that the
success of Mississippi’s civil rights movement relied upon the close-knit interpersonal
relationships between activists and the black communities in which they lived and
worked.4
Like Dittmer’s and Payne’s, this study focuses largely on events in Mississippi,
but more specifically the struggle within the capital city of Jackson. As an urban center
4

John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 19; Charles Payne, I’ve Got the Light of
Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995), 2-5.
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and seat of power for the state’s white power structure, Jackson differed from most
communities in the Delta where wealthy planters and industrialists exercised incredible
control over the social and economic lives of black Mississippians. This control was
often enforced by the threat of vigilante violence. Uncomfortable with a perceived image
of “lawlessness,” white officials in Jackson including Mayor Allen Thompson preferred
instead that police and white businessmen handle individuals who violated social mores
by arresting them or by employing economic reprisals. This project attempts to provide a
narrative of twentieth century civil rights protests that occurred in Jackson, but set within
the broader context of the Mississippi and much broader black struggle for freedom.
Well publicized events such as the 1961 Freedom Rides and the Freedom Summer of
1964, of course, continue to garner widespread attention from the public, but analysis of
the extended chain of events associated with the Jackson Movement illuminates a more
complicated understanding of how the community mobilized and sustained a grassroots
movement for social justice. Dittmer too narrowly defines the Jackson Movement as a
brief, but highly publicized period of protest activity that occurred between December
1962 and June 1963. Yet, by examining activity that preceded and followed the protests
of December 1962 to June 1963, this study broadens the definition of what constituted
the freedom struggle in Mississippi’s capital.
Furthermore, in the Jackson Movement, as in the broader Civil Rights Movement,
some black and white Americans openly supported challenges to discrimination, while
others staunchly resisted changes to the status quo. Other blacks and whites exhibited a
conflicted attitude towards segregation that, for many of them, fluctuated over time in
response to shifting socio-political events of the 1950s and 1960s. White and black
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Americans, influenced partly by their socioeconomic standing, race, gender, age, political
leanings, and religious views, struggled either to dismantle institutionalized
discrimination in Mississippi, to protect it, or were reluctant to act either way. This helps
to explain why neither Jackson’s white or black community presented a monolithic
response to the civil rights struggle in their midst. Disagreements existed within and
between civil rights organizations over protest strategy preferences, leadership roles,
publicity, and funding, while members of Jackson’s black community similarly argued
over the nature and extent to which they worked with activists, if even at all. Individuals
in Jackson’s white community, on the other hand, debated over what tactics they believed
were most effective for undermining civil rights activity or the extent to which they were
willing either to enforce or to help to dismantle segregation. This study attempts to
illuminate the shifting nature of how complicated motivations drove individuals to help
uphold or to help undermine institutionalized discrimination.
Chapter I introduces the four major civil rights organizations that coalesced
during the twentieth century and traces their movement into Mississippi. It also explains
how Medgar Evers of the NAACP mobilized a grassroots civil rights movement in
Jackson, and when joined by more activists in 1961, presented a powerful threat to city
officials by December 1962. Chapter II examines the way in which community youths
prompted even black conservatives to join a major wave of demonstrations throughout
1963 until a compromise with city officials offered token concessions. Although black
conservatives briefly stopped protest activity, young people nonetheless continued directaction protests and soon rekindled movement activity with wide support within Jackson’s
black community. Meanwhile, members of the four major civil rights organizations
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reorganized an alliance called the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) to
mobilize politically black communities to challenge segregation. Chapter III charts the
growing progress by Jackson Movement personnel in forcing concessions from the power
structure while members also worked within the COFO-led project to challenge
Mississippi officials politically. Yet, growing tension over funding and policy formation
gradually strained the alliance to its breaking point. This project concludes with a
discussion of how white Mississippi moderates and black conservatives forged a political
alliance to limit the speed of social change by impoverished black Mississippians and
their militant activist allies.
This study challenges Dittmer’s interpretation of the Jackson Movement by
arguing that a local, grassroots civil rights movement mobilized in Jackson, Mississippi,
as early as 1955. Dittmer’s argument that executive officers of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) killed the Jackson Movement in June
1963 obscures other factors that shaped civil rights activity in Jackson. Together with out
of state activists and volunteers, Jackson’s black community forced city officials and
most white-owned businesses to desegregate public facilities, end discriminatory hiring
and service practices, and extend the franchise to African Americans by the summer of
1965. Yet, a major schism increasingly pitted conservative, mostly middle-class black
Mississippians, including NAACP staff, against largely impoverished black
Mississippians supported by militant activists from the Student Nonviolence
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and other civil rights organizations over the extent to
which black communities sought to address continuing social and economic problems
after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Growing

7
disillusioned with the slow progress in achieving social justice, militant black
Mississippians and their allies attempted to organize independent social institutions that
addressed the needs of their community, but in the process, increasingly alienated
northern white liberals and the federal government. Conservative black Mississippians,
who had previously assisted movement activity, and white moderate Mississippians
increasingly undermined community-driven uplift efforts in favor of a more moderate
response to addressing continuing social problems through the political machinery of the
Democratic Party.

8
CHAPTER II
COMMUNITY AND COMRADES: EVOLUTION OF THE JACKSON CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT

There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over, and men are no
longer willing to be plunged into an abyss of injustice where they
experience the bleakness of corroding despair.
—Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from Birmingham City Jail,” May 1963
Historian John Dittmer suggests that a grassroots civil rights movement in
Jackson, Mississippi, began “inauspiciously in late 1962 when the north Jackson Youth
Council of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
announced a boycott against downtown merchants, charging them with a broad pattern of
discrimination against Black workers and consumers.”1 Yet, if defined more broadly to
include other civil rights protest strategies such as voter registration activity, picketing,
and courtroom litigation, the Jackson Movement began, much earlier, in 1955 when the
NAACP organized a petition drive to pressure city officials to desegregate public
schools. In the following years, young people and their adult NAACP allies slowly
mobilized the Black community of Jackson for social change, and when joined by
members of newly formed civil rights organizations by 1961, the Jackson Movement
represented a powerful challenge to Mississippi‟s segregationist power structure.
Myrlie Evers, wife of NAACP Field Secretary Medgar Evers, recalled that before
the 1954 Brown decision, “most Mississippi Negroes had slumbered along under a

1

John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 157.
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system of segregation that was a part of the fabric of their lives.”2 Southern White
leaders regularly underfunded Black schools compared to White schools, while the
political and business elite denied Black Mississippians most opportunities to earn more
than a subsistence living. Members of the White Citizens‟ Council, organized in 1954 by
Robert Patterson and administered by William J. Simmons, were dedicated to preventing
Blacks from gaining social, political, or economic equality with Whites and lodged
economic reprisals, such as denying loans or terminating employment, against anyone
perceived as having challenged social mores. Meanwhile, state and local officials
maintained a complex web of legal requirements for voting that, in most cases,
successfully kept African Americans off the voter rolls, denying them any meaningful
control over their political and economic destiny. The state‟s broad law enforcement
network maintained this status quo through arbitrary arrest and harassment, while White
vigilantes, who often enjoyed police assistance, readily employed violence against
anyone perceived to have violated social norms. 3
Institutionalized discrimination in access to viable housing and employment,
funding for educational facilities, and equal protection under constitutional laws pervaded
not just Mississippi and the South, but represented a national problem for African
Americans. In response, the NAACP formed during the early twentieth century as an
integrated organization dedicated to challenging discrimination throughout the United
States via courtroom litigation. By 1920, the NAACP operated branches across America,
2

Myrlie Evers with William Peters, For Us, the Living (Jackson: University Press
of Mississippi, 1996), 144.
3
Dittmer, Local People, 6-7; Charles Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The
Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Struggle, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1995), 34-35; Raymond Arsenault, Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for
Racial Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 288-89.
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including in Mississippi, but widespread fear of segregationist retaliation discouraged
most Black southerners from joining the organization. Mississippi and other southern
states, therefore, remained firmly within the grip of segregationist governments and
White citizenry during the early twentieth century.
Yet, a second civil rights organization emerged that helped to challenge
institutionalized discrimination in America. Formed by dedicated pacifists Bernice
Fisher, James Robinson, James Farmer, Joe Guinn, George Hauser, and Homer Jackson
in Chicago during 1942, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) advocated direct,
nonviolent protest as a means of social and political protest. Although Illinois state law
prohibited discrimination in eating establishments, several Chicago eateries such as Jack
Spratt‟s and Spencer‟s regularly refused to serve African Americans or to treat them with
respect. In response, the growing membership of CORE attempted unsuccessfully to
negotiate with owners to end such practices. By December 1962, CORE members
distributed leaflets, protesting the undignified treatment of Black customers, in an attempt
reduce patronage. By January 1943, staff began planning for the nation‟s first sit-down
demonstrations whereby a large group of interracial protestors occupied most seats in a
restaurant and refused to move unless served in a dignified manner. By June 1963,
revenue losses from sit-in protests prompted Jack Spratt‟s and Spencer‟s to begin serving
customers non-discriminately, demonstrating the potential effectiveness of nonviolent
confrontation as a means to challenge discrimination.4
Until the end of World War II, the NAACP and CORE operated largely outside
the South, but returning Black veterans precipitated a shift by which the NAACP and
4

August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights
Movement, 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 13-14.
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CORE paid greater attention to the affairs of southern Blacks. Empowered by their
service abroad, Black veterans sought meaningful expression of their citizenship, namely
the right to vote. Scores of them attempted to register to vote across the South, but
segregationists often threatened to kill them. On July 2, 1946, future NAACP Field
Secretaries Medgar and Charles Evers, both veterans, attempted to register in their
hometown of Decatur but were intimidated and turned away by twenty armed White men.
The growing number of Black veterans who joined the NAACP, however, prompted
chapters across Mississippi to form the State Conference of Branches in 1946 to
coordinate dialogue and strategy with each other and with the national staff.5 The
NAACP continued its efforts to secure the franchise for Black southerners and to
desegregate public transportation facilities through litigation, but historian Patricia
Sullivan suggests that the “fight against school segregation [soon] became the dominant
focus of the southern campaign.” 6
Meanwhile, CORE realized that it could potentially garner national publicity and
new membership by nonviolently testing southern compliance with the Supreme Court‟s
recent Morgan decision, which outlawed segregated seating arrangements in interstate
travel. An integrated group of CORE members took a two-week “Journey of
Reconciliation” through Virginia and North Carolina in 1946. Although the
demonstration did not prompt a change in their enforcement of transportation laws, the
ability of CORE staff to challenge segregation and prompt only a few arrests and little

5

Dittmer, Local People, 29; Myrlie Evers-Williams & Manning Marable, eds.,
The Autobiography of Medgar Evers: A Hero’s Life and Legacy Revealed Through His
Writings, Letters, and Speeches (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2005), 6-7.
6
Patricia Sullivan, Lift Every Voice: The NAACP and the Making of the Civil
Rights Movement (New York: New Press, 2009), 336.
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intimidation gained positive national attention for the organization and for the strategy of
nonviolent protest.7 The Journey of Reconciliation made clear the distinct strategy
differences between CORE and the NAACP during the 1940s and 1950s. Bayard Rustin
and George Hauser of CORE were “impatient with the NAACP‟s [conservative]
approach” by fighting discrimination through litigation, while Thurgood Marshall of the
NAACP warned that nonviolent civil disobedience in the South would “bring wholesale
slaughter and achieve nothing.” 8 Given the numerous atrocities White vigilantes had
committed against Black Americans in the South, Marshall had reasonable concerns to
urge a less confrontational approach to securing equality, but members of CORE, who
were no less cognizant of the dangers involved, were convinced of the necessity of
utilizing nonviolent confrontation as a means secure civil rights.
In 1951, the NAACP strengthened its presence by sending to the Deep South
newly appointed regional coordinator Ruby Hurley. Upon arrival, she urged the national
office to expand its financial and logistical support for voter registration, school
desegregation, and membership campaigns. While CORE did not organize any southern
branches until 1959, historian Patricia Sullivan points out that the national office of the
NAACP and its legal teams “worked closely with branches, advising them to petition
school boards to initiate desegregation, work with other community groups, and monitor
local sentiments” over the course of the 1950s.9 Into their midst, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC), a third major civil rights organization, evolved out of the
1955-1956 Montgomery Bus Boycott. Protesting discriminatory seating arrangements on

7

Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 33-39.
Sullivan, Lift Every Voice, 343.
9
Ibid., 421.
8

13
public buses, Black community members E.D. Nixon, Jo Ann Robinson, and Reverend
Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) organized
an alternative transportation system for Black commuters while they negotiated an end to
discriminatory busing regulations. For over a year, the Black community boycotted city
bus companies, economically crippling them, which eventually prompted business
leaders and city officials to halt discrimination in public transportation. 10
Although the NAACP made relatively slow advances in the South, the Supreme
Court‟s Brown v. Board ruling that declared school segregation unconstitutional
represented a milestone for challenging discrimination in the courtroom. After the
decision, the national office began formulating plans to coordinate school desegregation
efforts through its network of branches. When in 1955 Medgar Evers became Field
Secretary in Jackson, he and national staff planned a petition drive by which he would
call upon Black families to sign a petition demanding the city‟s compliance with the
Brown decision, which initiated the beginning of the Jackson Movement. A number of
Jackson-area families signed the petition, but members of the recently formed Citizens
Council retaliated immediately against them. WCC leaders fired some signatories and
denied loans to others. In exchange for relative protection, some Black informants spied
on supporters of the petition and provided information about them to White authorities.
Unidentified Whites then called prospective signers, threatening to harm them. Black
educators in the area, who feared losing their jobs, largely criticized the petition drive,

10

Sullivan, Lift Every Voice, 399-401; Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black
Equality, 1954-1992, revised edition (New York: Hill &Wang, 1993), 44-52.

14
and over the short course of the petition drive, Evers noticed that almost all signatories
frequently changed their minds and ultimately withdrew their support. 11
Dittmer suggests that in wake of the petition drive‟s relatively limited success, the
national NAACP office responded to this defeat “by dropping Mississippi like a hot
potato.”12 Yet, evidence reveals that during the 1950s, the organization merely shifted its
strategy in the state during the late 1950s rather than abandoning its Mississippi branches.
Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins informed Medgar Evers in 1956 that “we should like to
begin a long-time program of education and training for registration and voting in several
of the Southern states” and emphasized that “this will not be a ballyhoo campaign.” 13 By
April 1, 1958, the State Conference of Branches finalized its plan to organize voter
registration workshops that taught individuals in Jackson and Meridian, Mississippi how
to complete a voting application. Two months later, voter registration projects were
organized in the urban centers of Laurel and Vicksburg. In Jackson, precinct clubs and
volunteers distributed ten thousand handbills and one hundred placards that urged
citizens to pay their poll tax. While implementing its voter registration program, the
NAACP also conducted a membership drive to replenish its depleted ranks in
Mississippi. In April 1958, Evers directed each branch in the state to organize a Youth
Council to attract younger members, which modestly improved the organization‟s overall
membership. 14

11

Evers with William Peters, For Us, the Living, 146-48.
Dittmer, Local People, 52.
13
Roy Wilkins to Medgar Evers, December 18, 1956 as quoted in Evers-Williams
& Marable, The Autobiography of Medgar Evers, 59-60.
14
Medgar Evers to branch members, monthly report, June 23, 1958, Papers of the
NAACP, Cook Library, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS, part 27,
series A, reel 10, frame 00094 (hereafter cited as NAACP Papers); Medgar Evers to
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15
Yet, Professor Caryl Cooper points out that “African American opinion was not
unified in Mississippi” during the 1950s.15 Medgar Evers continued to face fierce
opposition from both conservative members of Jackson‟s Black community, particularly
Jackson State University President Jacob Reddix and Jackson Advocate editor Percy
Greene, and from segregationist officials. At a speaking engagement in California,
NAACP Field Secretary Medgar Evers lamented that,
So often we find Negroes of means who could well afford to lead our
people out of our present state but are nevertheless content with things as
they are, because of the personal profit they receive from segregation and
human misery. These people have been selected by Whites as leaders of
the Negro communities in an effort to stamp out any semblance of our
fight for justice and equality by the more militant Negro people. Many of
these “Uncle Toms” are given high educational posts, such as principals,
superintendents, and even college presidents, to bolster their community
prestige. In the case of principals there seems to be a conspiracy, on the
part of some state and county officials, to name all Negro schools that are
now being built after the principal, to further his or her prestige in the
community. A number of principals have assumed the role of community
dictator to the extent that they have totally discouraged the formation of
Parent-Teacher Associations to work with the schools. They have expelled
students who expressed an opinion or action favorable to the Supreme
Court Decision and in some cases, refused to permit student government
to function in school because of the political training it would provide
some of the more aggressive students, making them “incorrigible” to the
brainwashing techniques to which the curriculum subscribes. 16
When Amos Brown, the seventeen-year-old president of the West Jackson
NAACP Youth Council and president of the Southeast region of Youth Councils, openly
challenged his principal‟s criticism of the NAACP at a national convention,
branch members, monthly report, January 21, 1959, NAACP Papers, part 27, series A,
reel 10, frame 00190; Medgar Evers to branch members, monthly report, April 11, 1958,
NAACP Papers, part 27, series A, reel 10, frame 00065.
15
Caryl A. Cooper, “Percy Greene and the Jackson Advocate,” in The Press and
Race: Mississippi Journalists Confront the Movement, ed. David R. Davies (Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 2001), 65.
16
Medgar Evers to state branches, June 22, 1959, NAACP Papers, part 27, series
A, reel 10, frame 00239-00240.
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Superintendent of Schools Kirby Walker called his mother into a meeting and demanded
that she teach Brown to “obey his elders.” In another meeting, Principal Luther Marshall
accused Brown of not respecting the administration and of influencing other students to
disobey school and city officials. When Brown‟s mother refused to transfer him to
another school, Marshall expelled Brown and threatened to have him arrested if he
attempted to attend class again. 17 Reddix similarly threatened, on a regular basis, to
expel Jackson State students who violated social mores, which might prompt a White
backlash. Professor Caryl A. Cooper suggests that Black educators had a “vested interest
in maintaining the status quo” of segregation because it gave many of them a “certain
amount of prestige” in the Black community and because they feared losing their jobs if
schools integrated.18
If middle-class conservative Black Mississippians supported any changes to the
status quo, they often called for a slower pace in attempting to do so. Editor of the
Jackson Advocate, Percy Greene strongly supported and helped efforts to extend the
franchise to American Americans but often ridiculed prominent civil rights leaders and
those who engaged in nonviolent protests. Greene, who profited considerably from using
his newspaper as a mouthpiece for segregationists, did not agree with coercing Whites to
concede civil right gains because he remained confident that educated, upper-class Blacks
and Whites could solve social problems by working together. He even lambasted the
Brown decision because he, with justifiable concerns, worried that state leaders would
abolish the state‟s public education system rather than allow school integration. 19

17

Medgar Evers to Gloster Current, September 8, 1958, Ibid., frame 00121-00122
Cooper, “Percy Greene and the Jackson Advocate,” 65.
19
Ibid., 61-63, 66.
18

17
Conservative Black Mississippians, primarily educators and businessmen, tended to
militate against civil rights activity because they hesitated to participate in or support
activity that would probably elicit a White backlash and, often, to protect their own
socioeconomic interests.
Mississippi‟s segregationist officials, meanwhile, remained vigilant in
undermining civil rights activity. With ardent support from Governor James P. Coleman,
the state legislature authorized in 1956 the formation of the Mississippi State Sovereignty
Commission, which served as a watchdog agency for civil rights activity. Together with
conservative Black Mississippians like Percy Greene, Commission staff produced
pamphlets and videos showcasing a positive image of race relations in the state, while its
investigators compiled dossiers on suspected civil rights activists. In 1958, the state
legislature authorized the Sovereignty Commission to investigate NAACP activity in
Mississippi. 20
Starting in February 1960, however, student-led protests in North Carolina
bolstered the militancy of civil rights activity in the South. On February 1, 1960, a local
eatery in Greensboro, North Carolina, refused to serve students Joseph McNeil, Izell
Blair, Franklin McCain, and David Richmond. The young men remained in their seats,
yet were not attacked. Over the following week, a growing number of fellow students
joined them at the lunch counter, which increasingly disrupted business activity and
ultimately forced the establishment into bankruptcy. Over the following weeks, sit-in
demonstrations erupted in some thirty college towns across the Upper South including

20

Yasuhiro Katagiri, The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: Civil Rights
and States’ Rights (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), 18; NAACP, news
release, 1958, NAACP Papers, part 25, series D, reel 15, frame 00032.

18
Richmond, Winston-Salem, Nashville, Raleigh, and Chattanooga.21 Attracted by their
nonviolent approach, historians August Meier and Elliott Rudwick argued that CORE
“rushed to give assistance and guidance to the new activists.”22
In the wake of these student-organized protests, Medgar Evers, inspired by the
young demonstrators, informed the national NAACP office that “the unrest of young
people throughout the southland and the nation has had its influence on the young people
at Tougaloo College and Campbell College here in the Jackson area.”23 With exuberant
youth, Evers formed a NAACP Youth Council on the campus of Tougaloo. Furthermore,
Black students from Tougaloo College and White students from Millsaps College
secretly formed the Intercollegiate Fellowship Council in which young people discussed
social and political issues, including integration, until White officials discovered them a
few years later and forced the group to dissolve. 24 NAACP staff across the state,
however, seemed divided over the possible outbreak of direct-action protests in
Mississippi. Some officers, particularly Evers, accused the State Conference of
“dragging its feet” and therefore losing members to the more active organizations, while
state President C.R. Darden and others, fearing violent retaliation against demonstrators,
indicated that “there were things far more important that the State Conference should
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engage itself in, especially registration and voting.”25 Darden further feared that “if
members of our Youth Council were involved in protest movements of any sorts, hatred
for the organization would be more pronounced than ever before.” 26
If some state and national officials seemed hesitant to engage in nonviolent mass
protest, more than 700 high school and college students in the Jackson area were not.
During Easter week of 1960, area youth canvassed Jackson‟s Black neighborhoods in an
effort to convince community members to boycott the city‟s downtown shopping district,
where virtually every business had regularly discriminated against African Americans.
Although local newspapers claimed that the boycott had “apparently fizzled out,” Medgar
Evers announced that “the Sacrifice for Human Dignity boycott was gauged to [have
enjoyed] eighty to ninety percent cooperation,” as Black-owned businesses in the area
experienced a tremendous boom in business during the week of April 10 to April 16,
1960.27 Although its success was probably overstated to impress the national office, the
boycott enjoyed widespread support from Jackson‟s Black community, even among
conservatives, because participants risked little economic or physical reprisal for opting
not to buy from discriminatory businesses. Like the Montgomery Bus Boycott, a
community-enforced boycott represented a powerful protest strategy.
Meanwhile, building upon the upsurge in young militant activity across the
South, SCLC executive director Ella Baker organized a conference in Raleigh, North
25
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Carolina, for southern sit-in leaders to discuss the future of sustained protest activities.
During the April conference, participants formed the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) as a provisional, non-hierarchical, youth-led organization that
challenged all forms of discrimination through nonviolent protest.28 SNCC and CORE
soon initiated a chain of events that broke NAACP hegemony in Mississippi. With its
headquarters established in Atlanta, SNCC sent Bob Moses to visit the NAACP‟s Amzie
Moore in Mississippi during July 1960 to discuss the problem of gripping poverty among
African Americans. They ultimately concluded that securing meaningful voting rights
represented the most effective strategy in resolving the social and economic plight of
southern Blacks. Before Moses returned to Atlanta, the men sketched tentative plans for
a voter registration campaign in Mississippi.
Dittmer suggests, however, that its national staff “wanted Mississippi to remain
exclusive NAACP territory.” 29 He claims that national NAACP officers worried that the
SCLC, SNCC and CORE would attract funding, membership, and national attention
away from them. Yet, Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins assured SCLC‟s Martin Luther
King that “I know you join me in the determination not to have a break between our
groups [because] we seek the same goals and we have the same enemies.” 30 In addition,
Mississippi NAACP officers, along with staff from the other organizations, recognized
the possible advantages of cooperation, particularly the opportunity to face Governor
Ross Barnett with a unified voice. Despite initial worries over possibly losing sole
autonomy in the state, Medgar Evers organized the Council of Federated Organizations
28
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(COFO) in the spring of 1961 as a means for the NAACP, CORE, SNCC, and SCLC
collectively to discuss race issues with Mississippi Governor Barnett. Intrigued by this
new entity, Barnett decided to meet with the group although he made no concessions.
COFO disbanded after this one meeting but civil rights workers in Mississippi had taken
tentative steps towards forging an allied challenge to segregation in the Magnolia State. 31
Medgar Evers also capitalized on growing dissatisfaction in the Black community
by demanding in February 1961, that city officials hire more Black police officers, traffic
crossing guards, and sanitation workers; desegregate public transportation facilities;
ensure unfettered access to public facilities and services; and integrate schools in
compliance with the Brown decision. Nine students from Tougaloo College, however, did
not wait for the state and national NAACP offices to dismantle segregation through
courtroom litigation. On March 29, 1961, these students conducted the city‟s first sit-in
demonstration at the Jackson Municipal Library and were summarily arrested. In
response, several dozen student-led protests erupted in Jackson that evening and for
several days afterward. Police beat several of the youth who demonstrated, while
Jackson State University President Jacob Reddix threatened to expel any college student
who participated. Despite threats, area students also protested the April 19 arrest of four
young people who had attempted to integrate the Jackson bus lines. NAACP Youth
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Council members even collected information about the bus company‟s owners and the
number of riders each day to gauge the possible effect of a bus boycott. 32
In May 1961, CORE and SNCC became integrally involved in the Jackson
Movement. Testing southern compliance with the Supreme Court‟s December 1960
Boynton v. Virginia ruling, which prohibited the segregation of interstate terminal
accommodations, an integrated group of thirteen CORE volunteers left Washington D. C.
on May 4 in two separate buses destined for New Orleans. They agreed that, if arrested,
members would remain in jail rather than pay fines or post bail. The riders successfully
integrated bus stations in Virginia and North Carolina, but White mobs in South Carolina
and then in Alabama brutally attacked them. On March 14, a White mob in Anniston,
Alabama, waited for the Freedom Riders who arrived aboard a Greyhound bus. Whites
in the mob immediately smashed many of the bus‟s windows and slashed its tires, but the
riders were able, with police protection, to limp six miles outside of town until the tires
went flat. The mob, however, surrounded again the bus and firebombed it, causing it to
engulf in flame and smoke. The riders escaped death only because the mob, which had
been holding the door shut, feared an imminent explosion and released their grip on the
door to run away. Led by the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, a caravan of volunteers
transported the beleaguered riders to Birmingham for medical treatment. That same day,
Freedom Riders aboard the Trailways bus arrived in Birmingham into the hands of
another waiting White mob. For fifteen minutes, vigilantes viciously beat the
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demonstrators with their fists and with pipes and left before police arrived. Because no
bus driver seemed willing to drive the Freedom Riders to Montgomery, CORE
abandoned the campaign on May 17 and flew its members to New Orleans. 33
That same day, however, SNCC members from Nashville traveled south to
Birmingham to continue the Freedom Ride. Quickly arrested and later that night driven
back to the Tennessee border by Police Commissioner Eugene Conner, Diane Nash
organized another ride back into Birmingham and, on May 20, successfully rode buses
from Birmingham to Montgomery. Like their CORE counterparts, the newest Freedom
Riders arrived to a waiting mob who brutally beat them, some nearly to death. After
some recovery, the first group of twelve Freedom Riders left a Trailways bus station in
Montgomery for Jackson, Mississippi, on May 23. Highway Patrol officers from
Alabama, and later Mississippi, escorted CORE‟s Dave Dennis, Southern University
students Julia Aaron and Jean Thompson, Morehouse College student Harold Andrews,
NAG member Paul Dietrich, and SNCC‟s Nashville Movement veterans Jim Lawson,
Jim Bevel, C.T. Vivian, Bernard Lafayette, Joseph Carter, Alex Anderson, and Matthew
Walker, Jr. A second group of fifteen riders including Antioch College students Peter
Ackerburg, Lucretia Collins and Doris Castle; Nashville Movement veterans John Lewis,
Rip Patton, John Lee Copeland, Gady Donald, Clarence Thomas, and LeRoy Wright;
Howard University students Hank Thomas, John Moody, and Dion Diamond; Frank
Holloway of SNCC‟s Atlanta chapter; Jerome Smith of CORE‟s New Orleans branch;
and CORE‟s Jim Farmer left from the Greyhound bus terminal. Police arrested all
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twenty-seven demonstrators for breach of peace and for failure to obey a police officer
when they arrived in Jackson later that day. 34
Raymond Arsenault suggests that “many White Mississippians were
uncomfortable with the state‟s image as a lawless home of Negrophobic vigilantes” in the
wake of the bourgeoning Freedom Rides campaign.35 Mississippi politicians therefore
attempted to deflect criticism, suggests historian Keith Finley, “by labeling the
demonstrators [as] dangerous insurgents bent on flouting state law.” 36 Governor Ross
Barnett and the state legislature passed a flurry of new legislation designed to criminalize
almost any protest action, loosely defined, taken by the Freedom Riders. Rather than
allow White mobs to attack demonstrators openly, Jackson officials wanted to prosecute
demonstrators as criminals and therefore give the federal government less reason to
intervene on behalf of civil rights activists. The Kennedy administration, however,
wanted only to prevent any violence against demonstrators rather than provide any
meaningful assistance to them.
Historian Mary Dudziak argues convincingly that Cold War foreign policy
concerns and political pressure from southerners in the Democratic Party pressured
Kennedy to maintain a moderate civil rights agenda. In competing with the Soviet Union
for spheres of influence, Kennedy sought to convey in his foreign policy dealings the
appearance of meaningful assistance to civil rights activists, while assuring his southern
political base that he, in fact, only accepted limited changes to the status quo. Therefore,
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Kennedy agreed to a behind-the-scenes “Mississippi Deal” with Senator James O.
Eastland that if state officials protected the Freedom Riders from mob violence, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy would not interfere with Mississippi‟s efforts to arrest and
prosecute the demonstrators. The Mississippi Deal proved to be a double-edged sword as
state officials succeeded in keeping federal authorities out of their affairs dealing with the
Freedom Riders, but the lack of violence against demonstrators encouraged new waves of
activists to pour into the Magnolia State‟s capital. 37
Rejecting calls by the Kennedy administration to halt their demonstrations,
however, national officers of SNCC, CORE, and SCLC declared their intention to expand
the Freedom Ride campaign. Martin Luther King, Jr. organized the Freedom Ride
Coordinating Committee (FRCC) in Atlanta, which included SCLC‟s King and Bernard
Lee, Gordon Carey of CORE, Ed King of SNCC, two preachers, and a delegate of the
National Student Association. The group made plans to establish recruitment centers in
several southern cities to organize additional Freedom Rides to Jackson. In addition,
several SNCC members including Diane Nash, Lester McKinnie, Marion Berry, and
Charles Sherrod, as well as other Freedom Riders paroled in following weeks, formed the
Jackson Nonviolent Movement to help train community members in nonviolent protest
and to explain voting procedures.38
Raymond Arsenault argues that “an impatient vanguard of young Americans had
finally brought the struggle for racial liberation and democratic renewal to the one state
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[Mississippi] widely considered beyond redemption.” 39 Yet, the Freedom Riders and
members of the newly formed Jackson Nonviolent Movement actually reinforced
Jackson‟s mobilizing grassroots civil rights movement with additional personnel and
national media attention. On May 26, another group of four individuals left Nashville for
Jackson, stopping briefly in Montgomery, while a second group of nine Tennessee State
University students left Nashville later that day, riding to Jackson via Memphis. Police
arrested two groups of riders from Montgomery on June 2 and continued to arrest
Freedom Riders as they arrived throughout June and July of 1961. 40 In the meantime,
scores of Jackson youths attended nonviolent protests and voter registration workshops,
which prompted an outbreak of direct-action protests throughout the summer.
Authorities arrested numerous young people for attempting to desegregate various
facilities throughout the city, including the local zoo. On June 23, Tougaloo students
Mary Harrison, Joe Ross, Elnora Price, and Tom Armstrong entered a Trailways bus
station and bought tickets to New Orleans before sitting together in the White section.
Police subsequently arrested them.41
Away from prying media officials, police officers brutalized the civil rights
workers in the city‟s increasingly crowded prison facilities. To accommodate the
growing number of arrested demonstrators, on May 29, police transported twenty-four
Freedom Riders to the Hinds County penal farm, where guards beat and confined them to
their cramped cells. By June 12, city and county jails were filled, so demonstrators were
sent to Parchman Penitentiary. The first group of forty-five men, twenty-nine Black and
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sixteen White, arrived on June 15 and were immediately forced to strip nude and shave
off all facial hair. In order to further demean the men, they were kept nude in holding
cells with other prisoners before being locked away in isolation for most of each day.
Prison officials wanted to reinforce the power dynamics of the state by attempting to
demean the men and leave them powerless. 42
According to Dittmer, in response to the growing wave of direct-action protests
associated with the Freedom Ride campaign Jackson‟s “relatively large Black middle
class, composed mainly of teachers, ministers, and a small but influential group of
entrepreneurs, felt threatened by the Jackson Nonviolent Movement and wanted no part
of the politics of confrontation.” 43 A selective buying campaign seemed relatively
harmless, but conservative members of Jackson‟s Black community, including Percy
Greene and businessman R.L.T. Smith, were largely hesitant to support direct-action
protests that might elicit economic or vigilante reprisals against participants. Yet, several
upper class Black women joined the group Womanpower Unlimited to help provide
monetary and moral support for jailed protesters. Organized by businesswoman Clairie
Collins Harvey on May 29, the initial group of twenty Black women, most of whom were
in their forties and fifties and financially secure, raised funds and gathered supplies to
properly feed, clothe, and house demonstrators when released on bond. Even after most
Freedom Riders left Jackson by the summer‟s end, Womanpower Unlimited, which
eventually grew to over three hundred White and Black members, continued to organize
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massive food drives to help feed civil rights workers and to coordinate housing
arrangements for them. 44
Medgar Evers criticized SNCC and CORE for their “hastily gotten together
workshops” and reported to the NAACP‟s national office that demonstrators asked the
NAACP branch to pay for jail bonds. 45 The national staff disliked spending its own
funds to assist projects over which it exercised little control, but the NAACP Legal
Defense Team nonetheless supplied the bulk of bail money for demonstrators because
members recognized the importance of sustained struggle against Mississippi‟s
segregationist power structure. In addition, the NAACP national office filed for an
injunction against the city of Jackson, its police department, and the state of Mississippi
in an attempt to bar them from arresting individuals who attempted to use intrastate and
interstate travel facilities, including restaurants and the local airport. On July 11, the
Justice Department joined the NAACP‟s lawsuit to bar city and state officials from
arresting Freedom Riders. Two months later, the Interstate Commerce Commission
issued regulations barring separate facilities in transportation terminals, effective
November 1.46
By the end of the summer, authorities had arrested and released on bond more
than three hundred Freedom Riders and local youth protesters. Most non-natives went
home, but Arsenault noted that “the dozen or so who remained were part of a growing
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movement presence in Mississippi.”47 As the young people of Jackson took an
increasingly active role in pressuring the city‟s power structure, several SNCC and
CORE staff had decided to help organize projects in other parts of the state, particularly
in the city of McComb, while a small but vital group under the direction of CORE‟s
David Dennis remained in Jackson to continue assisting community-driven protests.
NAACP Youth Council members organized a widely supported boycott of the annual
state fair held in October and another boycott against downtown merchants during the
1961 Christmas season. By December, McComb‟s Black community, which had
experienced several violent reprisals, asked SNCC and CORE staff to leave town. Most
went to the Delta to plan operations for the next year, while SNCC‟s Bob Moses
canvassed the state to recruit new members. 48
In January 1962, the momentum of civil rights activism escalated throughout the
state as the Jackson Movement intensified voter registration activity while SNCC and
CORE staff mobilized civil rights projects in other Mississippi communities. The
national office of the NAACP lodged a federal lawsuit against the city of Jackson to
desegregate all public recreational facilities in Mississippi‟s capital while students from
Campbell College, Tougaloo College, and even a few from Jackson State University
canvassed Black neighborhoods in late January urging citizens to pay their poll tax and to
register to vote. Womanpower Unlimited began holding weekly voter registration
workshops and a few months later opened an office that allowed individuals, most of
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whom were unable to leave their jobs during the workday, to pay their poll tax outside of
working hours; SNCC‟s James Bevel, Diane Nash, and Lester McKinnie formed a
nonviolent movement in Laurel and began leading workshops on nonviolent protest in
both cities. By late February, several students in Laurel had participated in sit-in
demonstrations and were planning a boycott of downtown merchants. Despite continued
hesitation by adults, students in Laurel distributed leaflets urging Black members of the
community to boycott downtown merchants. 49
In February 1962, activists in Mississippi decided to address the “bureaucratic
wrangling and turf wars among the various organizations” that might undermine the
future effectiveness of protest activity. 50 After discussion, SNCC‟s Bob Moses, CORE‟s
Tom Gaither, and NAACP‟s Aaron Henry and Medgar Evers agreed to revive the COFO
alliance. Aaron Henry would serve as president, while Bob Moses became program
director and CORE‟s Dave Dennis his assistant. Utilizing funds from the Voter
Education Project (VEP), COFO planned to focus its efforts primarily on helping Black
Mississippians secure their right to vote.51 Dittmer suggests that “movement activity
continued throughout the spring and early summer of 1962, with mixed results.” 52
Direct-action protests did not force White authorities to concede anything, but they
nonetheless signified Black Mississippians‟ continued dissatisfaction with the status quo
49
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and a willingness to challenge it. With the umbrella alliance in place, members of
Jackson‟s Black community and COFO staff stood ready to expand civil rights activism
into the summer and fall of 1962.
In late April, Jackson Movement personnel boycotted the city‟s bus line after
officials ignored demands to end discrimination in seating arrangements. To help
provide for alternative transportation, SNCC‟s Lester McKinnie successfully made a deal
with area taxis to charge half their normal rate, which was equivalent to a normal bus
fare. Meanwhile, national NAACP officers urged all Mississippi branches to negotiate
with local businesses and insist that they end discriminatory practices in employment. If
employers refused, local branch leaders were to organize a boycott against them. In early
August, parents of nine Jackson students filed petitions with the local school board to
integrate schools, but were ignored.53 By early fall, a Tougaloo professor admitted that
“the young people in the Black community in Jackson, even though still afraid in most
cases, had been stirred in such a way that a great many were now interested in doing
something for civil rights.”54
Also by early fall, several SNCC staff had left Mississippi‟s capital for the
infamous Delta. Dittmer claims that these organizers had concluded that “Jackson was
not yet ready for a campaign centered on militant protest,” but historian Charles Payne
clarifies that SNCC had received five thousand dollars of VEP funds and, with the
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money, “went ahead with their plans for an enlarged voter registration drive” in several
Delta counties. 55 In addition, historian Clayborne Carson argues convincingly that
“throughout its history SNCC continued to support the notion that local community
groups should determine their own direction.” 56 Therefore, the SNCC members who
moved into the Delta did not abandon the Jackson Movement, but rather reinforced the
organization‟s commitment to fostering community-led uplift. Jackson‟s Black youth
now prepared to mobilize the entire Black community to challenge segregation.
Similar to the previous year, Jackson youths canvassed Black neighborhoods
calling for individuals to boycott the city‟s segregated state fair. Tougaloo student Anne
Moody remembered that one evening after several students had picketed the 1962
Jackson state fair, “it seemed as though every girl in the dorm was down in the lounge in
front of the set [and] were all shooting off about how they would take part in the next
demonstration.”57 When that day‟s picketers had arrived on campus, freshly bailed from
jail, students launched a massive rally that lasted until twelve-thirty, and “by this time all
the students were ready to tear Jackson to pieces.” 58 On November 7, 1962, Evers
praised the fact that the boycott proved about 90-95% effective in reducing revenues
earned, which again was probably an overestimation, and furthermore declared that “we
shall ask Negro Citizens to boycott the fair each year, so long as it is segregated.” 59
Young people in Jackson again organized a boycott against downtown merchants
in December. Unlike the previous year, however, Jackson Movement personnel agreed
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to sustain the boycott until city officials conceded to their demands. Although
conservative members of the Black community remained hesitant to participate in directaction demonstrations, their compliance with NAACP-organized boycotts between 1960
and 1962 proved invaluable to the bourgeoning grassroots struggle. Furthermore, now
allied with SNCC, CORE, and SCLC staff including Dave Dennis, Lester McKinnie, and
Bernard Lafayette, movement participants over the course of 1963 increasingly pulled
community members, even conservatives, into the streets and the county registrar‟s office
to challenge institutionalized discrimination.
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CHAPTER III
RISING TIDE OF PROTEST: THE JACKSON MOVEMENT ESCLATES
We live in a white man‟s world almost like slaves again, but we can‟t let
this go on any longer...we must fight.
—Betty Booker, student at Jim Hill High School
Young Black community members of Jackson, Mississippi, and adult members of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) initiated in
1955 a viable civil rights movement in the Magnolia State‟s capital, but staff from the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC), and the Conference of Racial Equality (CORE) broadened the
freedom struggle by 1961. By December 1962, movement personnel collectively
organized a powerful boycott against discriminatory downtown businesses and mobilized
Jackson‟s Black community for sustained protest activity over the course of 1963.
Despite token concessions by White officials and reluctance among some Black
conservatives, militant activists sustained direct-action protests against the city while
NAACP, CORE, SNCC, and SCLC staff across Mississippi, including those working
with the Jackson Movement, reorganized the Council of Federated Organizations
(COFO) in February 1962 to mobilize a state-wide political challenge to Mississippi‟s
segregationist power structure.
After a fourteen-month investigation into 150 complaints of civil rights violations,
the Mississippi Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported in
January 1963 that “only too rarely have we seen any indication that the state is eager or
even willing to punish those who, in its name, [terrorize] the innocent and the

35
defenseless.”1 The committee cited several instances in which White leaders attempted to
undermine its investigation by intimidating witnesses and urging other state officials not
to comply with questioning. The Advisory Committee concluded that Mississippi‟s
government blatantly violated the constitutional rights of its Black citizens and
furthermore admonished the federal government for its failure to ensure equal protection
under the law. Committee members finished their report by demanding that President
John F. Kennedy direct the Justice Department to launch criminal proceedings against
violators of federal civil rights laws and called upon Congress to pass legislation that
better protected the civil rights of all Americans. 2
Continued instances of discrimination in Jackson and across Mississippi prompted
civil rights activists to escalate protest activity starting in December 1962. Building on
the success of previous boycotts, NAACP Field Secretary Medgar Evers, Tougaloo
Professor John Salter, and President of the North Jackson NAACP Youth Council Colia
Liddell decided to boycott, yet again, downtown Jackson merchants during the 1962
Christmas shopping season, claiming they would sustain the protest “until Negro
shoppers are shown more respect and permitted to work at more than menial labor.” 3 The
boycott campaign began when, on the morning of December 19, thirty city police officers
arrested John Salter, his wife, and four students for picketing the Woolworth store on
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Capitol Street. Ten days later, police also arrested Tougaloo students Dorie Ladner and
Charles Milton Bracey for picketing.4 Evers acknowledged that “leading the selected
buying campaign were members of our North Jackson Youth Council and Tougaloo
College Chapter of NAACP,” who distributed leaflets around the city, spoke at churches,
and canvassed by phone Black community members, urging them to comply with the
boycott.5
By the end of 1962, the boycott had targeted 127 White-owned businesses
including Bagby Hall Motors, Jitney Jungle grocery stores, McRae‟s Department Stores,
Wilkinson‟s 555 Tire and Appliance Stores, and Star Super Markets throughout the city,
as well as all businesses on Capitol Street from State Street to Mills Street. Volunteers
continued to canvass Jackson‟s Black neighborhoods throughout the spring of 1963,
distributing more than 47,000 leaflets that urged continuing boycott compliance during
the upcoming Easter shopping season. Growing retaliation against voter registration
projects in the Delta, however, prompted movement personnel from around Mississippi,
including Jackson, to reinforce, whenever possible, COFO‟s presence in the dangerous
northwestern part of the state.6
After leaving Jackson in February to tour Delta communities, SNCC‟s Bob
Moses, Tougaloo student Jimmy Travis, and Voter Education Project (VEP) field director
Randolph Blackwell quickly realized that Greenwood, Mississippi, located in Leflore
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County, most urgently needed assistance. In retaliation for voter registration attempts by
several Black residents, the Leflore County Board of Supervisors in October 1962
claimed that distributing surplus federal foodstuffs to the area‟s impoverished residents
proved too costly and voted to shut down the program. Of this incident, sociologist
Charles Payne wrote that the county‟s decision only further convinced SNCC members
Hollis Watkins, Sam Block, Willie Peacock, and Lawrence Guyot of the Greenwood
COFO project that a connection existed between exclusion from the political process and
poverty. Over the winter, northern liberals, civic groups, and churches donated food and
medicine, which Mississippi staff such SNCC‟s Ivanhoe Donaldson and Ben Taylor, as
well as the NAACP‟s Medgar Evers, delivered to the beleaguered community,
particularly to those punished for attempting to register. In March, the NACCP‟s Amzie
Moore, CORE‟s Dave Dennis, SCLC‟s Annelle Ponder and Bernice Robinson, and
SNCC‟s Frank Smith, who additionally continued his work in Holly Springs, joined
Greenwood‟s staff. 7 The decision to cut surplus foodstuffs to impoverished Black
Mississippians illustrates the tenacity of White officials in their attempts to undermine the
freedom struggle. Yet, the incident also demonstrates the flexibility that activists
exhibited in overcoming obstacles to the broader Mississippi Movement.
Encouraged by a growing number of attempts by Black Greenwood residents to
register during the spring of 1963, Jackson Movement staff organized more workshops to
educate the public about the registration process and frequently canvassed homes in the
Black community, urging citizens to attend. For those who desired to register, volunteers
drove them to the courthouse or helped care for their children while they ventured to the
7
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court house on their own. The Mississippi Free Press, an alternative weekly newspaper
started in September 1961 by liberal White Mississippi lawyer Willigam Higgs and
conservative Black Jackson native Reverend Robert L.T. Smith, even printed copies of
the voting application in each of its weekly issues in an effort to help educate the public
about the registration process. To better coordinate voter registration work and directaction protests in the capital, Jackson businessmen I.S. Sanders and Sam Bailey, Rev.
R.L.T. Smith and other ministers, such as Dean Charles Jones of Campbell College and
Edwin King of Tougaloo College, along with activists John Salter, Medgar Evers,
NAACP Youth Council President Pearlena Lewis, and CORE‟s Dave Dennis formed a
strategy committee in early May, while a separate group of fifty prominent, middle-class
Black community members formed the Citizens‟ Committee for Human Rights to
encourage greater grassroots community support for the Jackson Movement. These two
groups agreed to meet regularly at a Masonic Temple lodge on Lynch Street, the heart of
Jackson‟s Black community. With a formalized leadership structure in place, the NAACP
State Conference of Branches voted unanimously to expand direct-action protest activity
in Jackson.8
While movement staff facilitated greater voter registration and picketing activity
during spring 1963, Jackson‟s White community exhibited mixed reactions. Ardent
segregationists wasted little time in falsely charging and convicting civil rights lawyer
William Higgs with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Higgs had assisted with
8
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most picketing cases in Jackson. Fined five hundred dollars and sentenced to six months
in jail, Higgs fled the state. In March, unidentified Whites fired shots into the NAACP‟s
Jackson office, which garnered little attention from police. Mayor Allen Thompson,
meanwhile, directed city police to canvass downtown Jackson constantly, arresting
almost all picketers, such as Tougaloo students Arverna Adams, Jimmy Armstrong,
Frank Dickey, and Austin Moore III, all Mississippi natives, on charges of obstructing a
sidewalk or for resisting arrest.9 Several middle-class White women even joined a civic
organization known as the Women for Constitutional Government, which provided
refreshments for police officers on duty and publically labeled critics of Mayor Allen
Thompson and Governor Ross Barnett as communists. 10 Although Black Mississippians
and their White allies mobilized a viable civil rights movement in the capital, the state‟s
power structure pushed back with a variety of tactics. White authorities ardently sought
to undercut movement activity whenever possible while showing little concern for
vigilante retaliation against activists illustrating, once again, that Black Mississippians
and their allies did not enjoy equal protection under the law in the Magnolia State.
On the other hand, despite possible legal, economic, or vigilante retaliation, some
Whites in Jackson criticized hard-line segregationists. Historian David Chappell suggests
that White southerners who openly supported the movement were a small minority, but
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“they saw themselves as defending, not attacking, the best of southern tradition.”11 While
most White ministers in Mississippi were avowed segregationists, Dr. W.B. Selah of
Galloway Memorial Methodist Church in Jackson called publicly for city schools to
desegregate. Later, Selah and Rev. Jerry Furr, also of Galloway Methodist Church,
resigned in protest when ushers turned away integrated groups of worshipers from their
church. 12 The editors of the Mississippi Free Press, some of whom were White native
Mississippians, wrote scathing editorials regularly, arguing at one point that “we cannot
continue to elect to office politicians who think they can carry public favor by advocating
defiance of constituted authority, disrespect for their government and open defiance of
the law.”13 They furthermore pleaded to the public that:
We know that people are not born to hate. It is not natural for Negroes
and Whites to hate and fear each other. By making people who disagree
afraid to oppose them, the racists have created a climate of ignorance and
fear in Mississippi. One legislator said that they didn‟t always want to go
along with the segregationist measures—often they were stupid laws—but
they were afraid not to. Our problems are made more serious by the fact
that people are afraid to speak out with solutions—afraid of the
conservatives and racists who control public opinion.14
Strategy committee member John Salter remembered that he and other movement
staff met White residents of Jackson “who subscribed to the essence of what Medgar
[Evers and other movement leaders] had to say, but remained silent, choked by the same
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mantle of fear that so long strangled their community and state.”15 For example, activists
spoke with White pastors and parishioners who admitted their support for integrated
church services but refused to say so publicly due to possible retaliation from the White
Citizens‟ Council. Although many dissenters remained silent, some covertly provided
valuable funding, legal advice, and news about current sentiments among Jackson‟s
White citizens. While media outlets assured the public that boycott activity made little
impact on downtown trade, unidentified White clergymen informed movement officials
that businessmen complained regularly about plummeting profits in the wake of the
Jackson boycott. Prolonged sales advertisements and an offer from the mayor to lower
property taxes indicated that many White-owned businesses were indeed affected
negatively. Jackson Movement staff monitored the situation with interest, particularly
since boycott activity organized by Montgomery, Alabama‟s Black community in 1956
had economically crippled White business leaders, who then helped pressure city officials
to end discrimination on public transportation. 16
Meanwhile, the Jackson Movement escalated intensely in the middle of May
1963. Until then, the NAACP‟s national office had allowed its Jackson Branch
considerable autonomy over local policy decisions, preferring instead to monitor events
from New York City and, when called upon, to provide the necessary bail bonds and
litigation for arrested protestors. On May 15, however, national NAACP officers arrived
in Jackson to announce additional demonstrations and to bail out recently arrested
demonstrators.17 Dittmer argued correctly that “the reason for this sudden shift in policy
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[the direct involvement of national staff] was, in a word, Birmingham.”18 Invited by Rev.
Fred Lee Shuttlesworth of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights, SCLC‟s
Martin Luther King Jr. and members of Birmingham‟s Black community demanded in
April 1963 that city officials desegregate public facilities, end discriminatory
employment practices, and form a bi-racial committee to hear grievances from Black
citizens. When White officials refused, thousands of grassroots protesters poured into
Birmingham‟s streets during the first days of May. They were met by Police
Commissioner Eugene “Bull” Connor and city police who viciously beat and arrested
over one thousand peaceful protesters, including women and children. Distraught by the
negative media attention surrounding police brutality, Birmingham‟s Senior Citizens‟
Committee, representing the city‟s Chamber of Commerce, agreed on May 10 to
implement movement demands according to an established timetable. 19
Dittmer claims that the NAACP‟s national office intervened in Jackson because it
feared the prospect of SCLC‟s newfound fame gained through its protest activity in
Birmingham overshadowing its own efforts in Mississippi. Indeed, after Birmingham
capitulated, NAACP, CORE, SCLC, and SNCC national offices increasingly competed
with each other for funding, media attention, new recruits, and moral support from White
liberals and from the Black communities in which movement staff lived and worked. 20
Yet, more important than any potential advantage one organization could garner over the
others, Jackson Movement activists and national NAACP officers realized that “if such a
bastion of segregation [Birmingham] could be defeated, then any other city or area [like
18
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Jackson] could be brought to heel by an aroused Black community,” particularly one with
additional personnel and funding. 21
The strategy committee in Jackson, now augmented by national NAACP staff,
immediately appointed community members to a negotiation committee, which would
meet with city officials and White business leaders to reiterate original movement
demands. Between May 21 and May 27, both sides discussed the prospect of hiring Black
police officers and crossing guards, enacting fair employment practices, desegregating
local schools and public facilities, and organizing a bi-racial committee to hear
grievances of Jackson‟s Black community. During negotiations, several White
businessmen voiced concerns over the possible impact of continued disorder and possible
violence. 22 By the end of the week, Mayor Allen Thompson finally capitulated to the
demands in front of the negotiation committee, but “before the movement could
celebrate, Thompson, who was probably being pushed from different sides, recanted.” 23
This sudden reversal certainly illustrates how White leaders were typically beholden to
the whims of hard-line segregationists such as those of the White Citizens‟ Council.
Confident that well-publicized demonstrations would force White officials in
Jackson to accept movement demands, a group of students on May 28 began picketing in
front of the downtown J.C. Penny‟s to distract police while students Anne Moody,
Pearlena Lewis, and Memphis Norman sat down to demand service from Woolworth‟s
lunch counter. Individuals already at the counter quickly slipped away in fear of
imminent violence. Although initially dismissive of their action, angry Whites soon
21
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formed a mob and began taunting the demonstrators, calling them communists. An
unidentified White man slapped Moody, threw Norman on the ground and nearly
stomped him to death before police arrested both him and the assailant. Over the next
two hours, the mob, joined by local high school students, insulted, beat, and poured
condiments over the demonstrators who were joined by former Freedom Rider and White
Tougaloo student Joan Trumpauer from Arlington, Virginia, CORE‟s George Raymond,
and Tougaloo faculty Lois Chaffe and John Salter. An unidentified individual struck
Salter in the face with brass knuckles and hit the back of his head with a heavy object,
nearly knocking him unconscious, before someone else splashed peppered water into
Salter‟s eyes. Police and media officials just stood by observing. After having been
beaten, ridiculed, and otherwise “taught a lesson,” Moody and the others were allowed to
leave by police and the White mob.24
After the indignity protestors had suffered during the Woolworth sit-tin, Moody
suggested that Jackson quickly became “the hotbed of racial demonstrations in the South”
with mass rallies held nearly every night.25 In schools throughout the city, students, who
became increasingly impatient with the conservatism of so-called “uncle tom” educators,
repeatedly walked out of school to protest continued segregation. As demonstrations
grew in intensity, Moody remembered, “it seemed as though most of the Negro college
and high school students there were making preparations to participate [and] those who
did not go to jail were considered cowards by those who did.” 26 Even adult members of
the community mobilized to assist protest activity. Womanpower Unlimited, an
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integrated group of primarily middle-class women who “sought to appeal to women‟s
moral and religious beliefs and encouraged [White and Black women] to take an active
stance against racism,” grew to over 300 members by 1963 and began holding interfaith
prayer fellowship meetings twice a month to discuss race issues. 27 These women actively
encouraged other community members to donate money, give encouraging moral support
to young demonstrators, drive them to picketing areas, and bail them from jail. Most of
Jackson‟s Black community had mobilized into a major grassroots civil rights movement
and, with outside activists, prepared to force the city to its knees.
Yet, protest activity remained dangerous, as demonstrators routinely experienced
instances of personal hardship and segregationist retaliation. Many student activists found
it increasingly difficult to stay in or do well in school. Anne Moody admitted, “I had
become so wrapped up in the Movement that by the time mid-semester grades came out I
had barely a one-point average, [while] other students who had gotten involved with the
NAACP were actually flunking.”28 Adults faced the greater threat of economic
retaliation, as they were more likely to be working full time and trying to raise a family.
Families with low-paying jobs could hardly afford to lose a paycheck if one parent or
both lost their jobs for openly demonstrating or supporting demonstrations. In addition,
police continued to arrest and beat demonstrators, including women, children, and some
bystanders. Testimony given before the Mississippi Civil Rights Advisory Board reveals
that Jackson police beat and falsely charged James Wilson Jones with resisting arrest
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only for watching a mass march proceed past his front porch.29 The Jackson Movement
carried great risks to the entire Black community. Individuals involved with protest
activity still faced the threat of economic reprisal, arrest, or vigilante violence while any
Black Mississippian in the city could fall victim to indiscriminate intimidation or
violence.
Charles Payne noted in his masterful I’ve Got the Light of Freedom that even with
the Black community of Jackson, Mississippi, mobilized for sustained protest, national
NAACP officers and some of the more conservative members of Jackson‟s Black
community increasingly worried about the vast amount of money tied up in bail bonds
and the “possibility that demonstrations would get out of hand,” resulting in
unprecedented bloodshed. 30 Historian John Dittmer argued that “although [NAACP
Executive Director Roy] Wilkins and his New York staff ostensibly came to town to offer
assistance, they quickly took over planning and strategy” and forged an alliance with
conservative Blacks, namely I.S. Sanders and R.L.T. Smith on the strategy committee
and the prominent businessman of the Citizens‟ Committee for Human Rights, in Jackson
by early June “to apply the brakes to demonstrations.” 31 Inviting additional conservative
clergy members to join the strategy committee, NAACP Director of Branches Gloster
Current declared that direct-action protests would taper off while the committee
intensified boycott activity, lodged additional litigation against the city, and shifted
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overall movement activity in Jackson towards another voter registration campaign. Most
members of the strategy committee were confident that they could force city officials to
concede, while minimizing violence and expensive bail bonds. John Salter, militant
youth in the community, and other COFO staff, however, believed that Jackson‟s White
leaders would never negotiate in good faith and called for continued demonstrations. 32
News circulated around town over the next few days that picketing and sit-in
demonstrations were supposedly coming to an end, and on June 6 Jackson officials
secured an injunction against movement officials which barred public demonstrations.
Nonetheless, the following day police arrested twenty-six youth in downtown for
protesting against the injunction, and on June 9, about two dozen young people attempted
to worship at local churches. Except for the Catholic Church, laymen at other White
churches turned demonstrators away. Most NAACP staff dismissed calls for a mass
march or, like Medgar Evers, remained silent. Meanwhile, members of the strategy
committee faced growing threats of retaliation. Unidentified Whites drove past
Tougaloo‟s campus nearly every night, yelling threats and obscenities, while Medgar
Evers and John Salter received harassing phone calls. Salter sent his wife and young
daughter to Minnesota. Evers, who had a Molotov cocktail thrown into his carport on
May 29, admitted to his wife that his death seemed imminent. Jackson buzzed with
uncertainty about the future of demonstrations until a single bullet in the early morning
hours of June 12, 1963, brought the city to silence, if only for a few hours. Byron De La
Beckwith, an ardent segregationist, hid in some bushes across the street from Medgar
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Evers‟s home and shot him in the back as he emerged from his car. Evers bled to death
within an hour.33
In the hours and days following Evers‟s murder, Jackson‟s Black community
exploded in a torrent of angry protest. Early that morning, a group of fourteen ministers
including Rev. Haughton of Pearl Street Church and Campbell College chaplain Rev.
Charles Jones were arrested after walking two blocks down Lynch Street in the heart of
the Black community. The murder of Evers had prompted even some conservative
clergy, many of whom had previously refused to march, to express their dissatisfaction
with blatant abuses by segregationists. Colia Liddell, now married to SNCC‟s Bernard
Lafayette and working with a project in Selma, Alabama, happened to be visiting that day
and immediately helped Salter organize another protest march. Two hundred marchers,
about evenly split between adults and Tougaloo students and community youths,
similarly stepped out onto Lynch Street but were met by 150 police. Armed with batons
and rifles, they beat, arrested, and then stuffed 150 into waiting paddy wagons and empty
garbage trucks before transporting them to the Jackson fairgrounds stockade. Police
spotted Salter and Ed King but refused to arrest them, preferring instead to stare
menacingly at them for a minute before leaving.34 White Mississippi officials often
refused to believe that African Americans were willing and capable of demonstrating on
their own terms. Instead, segregationists typically perceived that outside, White agitators
were somehow responsible for inciting Black Mississippians to protest. Police, therefore,
probably assumed that Salter and King had used the Black demonstrators as “pawns” to
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achieve whatever insidious goals they had and so officers chose to project the might of
Jackson‟s police force and intimidate them.
Meanwhile, the NAACP‟s Anne Moody and SNCC‟s Dorie Ladner ran onto the
campus of Jackson State University calling for students to join a protest march slated to
start at Pearl Street AME church. Although President Jacob Reddix ran the activists off
campus that morning, dozens of students showed up later to march. Singing Freedom
Songs and carrying small American flags, marchers were intercepted by some 200 police
on Rose Street, still in the Black section of town. Police pulled their flags away and
threw them on the ground, beating anyone who resisted. Like those arrested earlier, the
marchers were denied healthcare and taken to the Jackson fairgrounds and left for several
days. Militant activists immediately began planning for a massive demonstration after
the funeral of Medgar Evers.35 Despite pressure from the national NAACP and
conservative members on the strategy committee to slow the pace of nonviolent protest,
thousands of Black community members ignored them and demonstrated anyway. The
strategy committee helped to guide protest activity in Jackson, but the Black community
itself exercised agency over the freedom struggle in Mississippi‟s capital.
On June 15, 1963, about four thousand men, women, and children, including
well-known movement leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., along Jackson‟s militant
youth like Moody and Ladner attended the funeral service for Medgar Evers. To help
stem the possibility of a major riot, Mayor Allen Thompson authorized the funeral
procession to conduct a silent march honoring Evers, but he and strategy committee
members warned community members not to carry flags, sing freedom songs, or shout
35
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slogans. Although the funeral procession remained solemn for much of the morning, it
did not take long for frustrations over the indignities African Americans had suffered in
Jackson to resurge. While walking down Farrish Street, hundreds of demonstrators defied
city officials and conservative movement leaders and began marching towards Capitol
Street, singing freedom songs. Police intercepted the marchers, fired bullets over their
heads, and savagely beat many of them before taking over one thousand individuals to
the Jackson fairgrounds stockade. Many were placed in sweatboxes, locked inside cars,
or left outside in the sun without water.36 Meanwhile, those who evaded arrest began
throwing rocks and glass bottles at the police. In an effort to avoid a full-scale riot,
Attorney John Doar of the Justice Department, who had been working with movement
officials in Jackson, grabbed a bullhorn from a police officer and shouted to the angry
crowd that “this wasn‟t the way” and urged them to return home. CORE‟s Dave Dennis
and a few others began taking bottles from the crowd and similarly urged them to leave
the area.37
Dittmer suggested that the “primary objective” of President John F. Kennedy and
his brother Attorney General Robert Kennedy “was to bring an end to violence, which
meant getting Black people off the streets,” so the administration urged Jackson officials
to meet with members of the Black community to discuss a compromise they hoped
would pacify both sides. 38 On June 18, just three days after the funeral, city officials
promised to hire one garbage truck driver and six Black police officers within sixty days
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and eight crosswalk guards by September, in exchange for an end to demonstrations. In a
mass meeting held that night, hundreds of Black Jackson residents voted to accept the
city‟s compromise offer, and the strategy committee subsequently announced a plan for a
revitalized voter registration program. Dittmer wrote that in the wake of the compromise,
“the death of Evers and the disillusionment over the Kennedy supported agreement with
mayor Allen Thompson demoralized the young people who had originated and sustained
the boycott.”39 Several SNCC members temporarily moved back into the Delta to
reinforce community organizing efforts, while Ann Moody and Dave Dennis moved to
Canton to assist a CORE project recently started by George Raymond. Though the
compromise fell far short of the Jackson Movement‟s original goals, most national
NAACP officers seemed confident that they had helped to secure a major civil rights
victory and flew back to New York.40
Yet, Dittmer concludes incorrectly that because of the June 1963 agreement,
Jackson “continued as a central headquarters for civil rights organizations [in
Mississippi], [but] the Black community never again sustained a movement of its own.” 41
By reviewing the events that followed after the agreement, however, a plethora of
evidence reveals that the community-driven civil rights movement in Jackson did not
falter but actually accelerated after June 1963. SNCC‟s Atlanta office assured the public
that even if the NAACP made a statement to the effect of stopping demonstrations in
Jackson, SNCC, SCLC, and CORE members were still in the area and willing to continue
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demonstrations. More importantly, many of Jackson‟s Black community, like individuals
in other communities, exhibited growing militancy in the struggle, and for them, token
compromises were no longer acceptable until they secured immediate and meaningful
political, social, and economic changes. They remained determined to continue
demonstrating despite reservations among middle-class Black conservatives and
continued White segregationist resistance. By analyzing events that occurred before and
followed after the more highly publicized periods of protest activity, one can understand
civil rights activity as a more extended historical process.42
Ignoring the compromise, young protestors attempted to attend services at several
White churches in the following weeks. Four worshippers successfully attended service
at an Episcopal Church and the Catholic Church never turned anyone away, but laymen
in other churches turned away any African Americans who attempted to attend White
services. In the following weeks, as expected by Jackson militants, Mayor Thompson
refused to desegregate schools, public parks, golf courses, eating establishments, movie
theatres, or to even form a bi-racial committee. Jackson officials even drained public
swimming pools to prevent the possibility of integration. The strategy committee and
many in the Black community believed that city officials had negotiated in good faith and
would comply with the agreement, but by July it seemed evident that the mayor and city
aldermen would not meaningfully fulfill their obligations. Jackson‟s Black community,
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even its conservative ministers who had earlier called for marches to stop, rekindled mass
protest activity against the power structure.43
The strategy committee also tightened boycott pressure against downtown
merchants. Jackson‟s Black community forced Jordan‟s Supermarket on Lynch Street,
originally targeted for boycott after an employee slapped a Black customer, as well as
King the Tailor, a downtown tailoring shop, out of business. The NAACP estimated that
75% of previous customers, probably an overstatement, in Jackson stayed away from
those businesses listed on the official boycott list. Growing economic pressure convinced
Star Supermarket and, one month later, New Deal Supermarkets to reform their hiring
and customer treatment policies. By the middle of September, city officials hired eight
crossing guards for Black schools but also pushed back against the movement by
purchasing a new armored riot wagon capable of holding more prisoners at any given
time, while state attorneys convinced the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to halt any
immediate efforts to desegregate the city‟s public school system. 44
Meanwhile, the broader Mississippi Movement shifted its focus in the fall 1963.
Protest activity continued in Jackson and in other cities, but as historian Harvard Sitkoff
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argued that demonstrators increasingly “considered the ballot box the key to empowering
the dispossessed [and] they sought to organize the political strength of the Black masses
as a weapon against both racism and poverty.” 45 White officials regularly denied
meaningful enfranchisement to Black Mississippians, allowing only a token number of
African Americans onto voter registration rolls. Hinds County re-opened its voter
registration book by September, but White officials had removed all furniture from the
room, locked the restrooms, allowed Whites to skip to the front of the line, and enrolled
only thirty out of two-hundred Black applicants. Institutionalized voter discrimination,
not apathy as White officials claimed, left Black communities effectively powerless to
control their own political and economic destinies. During the fall, therefore, Black
Mississippians and their allies organized two protest voting drives which they believed
would illustrate the powerlessness of Black communities and, supporters hoped, would
prompt federal officials to intervene and ensure unfettered voting rights. 46
SNCC‟s Bob Moses, who had originally provided a blueprint for a voter rights
campaign in Mississippi, organized the first protest vote to coincide with the August 25
gubernatorial primary. At churches and community centers around the state, over 27,000
unregistered Black Mississippians voted on unofficial ballots which helped to negate the
idea that African Americans did not aspire to vote. Following the August protest vote,
Aaron Henry, Dave Dennis, Bob Moses, and Al Lowenstein reformed the COFO alliance

45

Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954-1992, revised edition
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1993), 156.
46
“Voter Registration—17 to 3,” September 14, 1963, MFP Komisar Collection,
box 1, folder 4 “COFO Launches Vote Campaign,” December 21, 1963, MFP Komisar
Collection, box 1, folder 4; “Negroes to File Freedom Votes,” August 24, 1963, MFP
Komisar Collection, box 1, folder 4; SNCC, Mississippi Freedom Vote Campaign
pamphlet, undated, SNCC Papers, reel 38, A:XV:135, frame 0676.

55
to direct voter registration projects around the state in an effort to politically mobilize all
Black Mississippians. With encouragement from Bob Moses, Al Lowenstein invited
financially independent White students from Yale and the College of the Pacific to assist
the “Freedom Vote” campaign, slated to coincide with the state‟s November general
election. Aaron Henry and Ed King ran as unofficial candidates for governor and
lieutenant governor on a platform calling for universal suffrage, desegregation of schools
by 1965, a crash program to improve all phases of education, non discrimination in
employment and the creation of a job training program, a viable minimum wage, and the
repeal of anti-labor laws. 47
On November 5, 90,000 Black Mississippians voted for Aaron Henry and Ed
King on protest ballots. Of this milestone, historian Eric Burner wrote that “the
psychological reward of the Freedom Vote was a much-needed impetus” for Black
Mississippians. 48 They demonstrated that state officials purposefully denied meaningful
franchise and that tokenism was no longer acceptable. Capitalizing on the momentum
generated by the 1963 protest vote campaign, SNCC‟s Bob Moses laid out the foundation
for what became the 1964 Freedom Summer project at a November 14 COFO meeting.
Staff would invite northern Whites to Mississippi to help twenty thousand Black
Mississippians register to vote between December 1963 and March 1964 in anticipation

47

“Negroes Mount Massive Protest: 27,689 Cast Ballots Miss. Didn‟t Want,”
August 31, 1963, MFP Komisar Collection, box 1, folder 4; Aaron Henry, interview, 40;
SNCC, advertisement for Freedom Vote, undated, SNCC Papers, reel 38, A:XV:114,
frame 0355.
48
Burner, And Gently He Shall Lead Them, 119.

56
of the state‟s congressional primaries. COFO-backed candidates planned to challenge
each of Mississippi‟s segregationist congressional leaders. 49
The Jackson Movement did not exist only between December 1962 and June
1963. NAACP branch staff and community members forged a viable civil rights
movement in Mississippi‟s capital in 1955, which became extremely well-publicized
starting in December 1962. Throughout early 1963, Jackson Movement staff accelerated
protest activity while COFO reorganized to begin building a state-wide political
challenge to segregationist officials. Uncomfortable with the growing militancy of the
movement, national NAACP officers and conservative members of the Black community
began to pressure Black Jackson citizens and city officials to reach an agreement and end
mass demonstrations before violence grew too costly. By June, city officials offered
Jackson Movement leaders better employment opportunities for the Black community in
exchange for an end to public demonstrations. Convinced that Mayor Thompson had
negotiated in good faith, strategy committee leaders accepted the compromise. Yet, the
more militant Black community members and activists ignored both city officials and
conservative Blacks and sustained the Jackson Movement. When Thompson did not
meaningfully honor the agreement, Jackson‟s wider Black community rekindled protest
activity and began forming a grassroots political challenge to segregation.
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CHAPTER IV
MISSISSIPPI RECKONING: DIVERGENCE WITHIN THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE
We know through painful experience that freedom is never
voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the
oppressed
—Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from Birmingham City Jail,”
May 1963
In fall 1963, the Black community of Jackson, Mississippi, led by a strategy
committee composed largely of middle-class African Americans and NAACP branch
staff including R.L.T. Smith and Charles Evers, secured its foothold in attempting to
dismantle institutionalized discrimination in the capital and decided to work more closely
with Council of Federated Organizations (COFO)-led voter registration efforts. An
umbrella alliance constituted by members of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the
Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), and the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), COFO sought to empower Black Mississippians over
the course of 1964 by forming an alternative political challenge to Mississippi’s
segregationist power structure. From early 1964 to the summer of 1965, however,
tension over funding, decision-making, publicity, and growing radicalism among some
alliance members gradually fractured the COFO alliance and precipitated a schism within
the Mississippi Movement in which militant activists continued to struggle for their
conception of freedom while conservative Black Mississippians attempted to work within
the regular Democratic Party to address continuing social problems.
As 1964 approached, city officials of Jackson, Mississippi, still refused to
comply fully with movement demands that they desegregate public facilities, meet
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regularly with the strategy committee to hear grievances, and hire at least twelve African
American police officers and several school crosswalk guards to work in Black
neighborhoods. In response, the strategy committee, which had coordinated most civil
rights activity in Jackson up to this time, voted to continue the boycott against
discriminatory downtown merchants while demonstrators on their own accord protested
against the crowded and dilapidated conditions in Black schools. Although Mayor Allen
Thompson attempted to break the boycott by offering prize money and free groceries to
the winner of a segregated Christmas house decoration contest, Jackson’s Black
community repudiated the ruse in light of continued injustice throughout the state, and to
honor the memory of Medgar Evers, President John Kennedy, and the four little girls
killed in the September 15 bombing of Birmingham’s Sixteenth Street Baptist Church. 1
Boycott pressure soon forced both Herman’s Jewelers and O.P.O. Men’s Wear on
Capitol Street into bankruptcy, and by early 1964, the Boston Shoe Store and the Burns
& Lacy Company also fell victim to the boycott. Meanwhile, declining revenues as a
result of the boycott forced Jackson bus companies to cut their operating hours. State and
national NAACP officers brought additional economic pressure on the city by urging
national chain stores to pressure their southern branches to end discrimination and even
convinced several national entertainers to cancel performances in the city. Finally, the
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NAACP scored a major victory in March when it convinced Judge Sidney C. Mize to
order Jackson, Biloxi, and Leake County school boards to provide plans, no later than
July 15, 1964, to integrate by at least one grade-level per year.2
Although the Jackson Movement had entrenched itself firmly for sustained
struggle by early 1964, John Dittmer notes correctly that “Jim Crow still held sway in the
Magnolia State, with Black Mississippians relegated to inferior jobs, schools, and health
care.”3 COFO, therefore, finalized plans for its 1964 state-wide summer project designed
to help enfranchise all Black Mississippians. Several movement veterans, particularly
SNCC’s Fannie Lou Hamer, argued that securing equitable access to the ballot
represented “as much a battle for Black equality as it was a fight to determine the future
course of the state” and could be “an efficient and near-sure way to meet local needs” of
all citizens. 4 By voting out ardent segregationists, Black Mississippians could help elect
officials that were more responsive to all constituents. Crucial to the summer project,
nearly three hundred people on April 26, 1964, formed the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party (MFDP) in Jackson. Members planned to participate in Democratic
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Party caucuses by running alternative candidates against incumbent segregationists.
MFDP members Victoria Grey of Hattiesburg, Fannie Lou Hamer of Ruleville, James
Houston of Vicksburg, and the Reverend John Earle Cameron of Hattiesburg planned to
challenge, respectively, Senator John Stennis, Representative Jamie Whitten of
Charleston, Representative John Bell Williams of Raymond, and Representative William
Colmer of Pascagoula for their congressional seats.5
Yet, historian Chana Kai Lee Yet wrote that movement veterans realized that “it
made little sense to recruit the disfranchised to go into a courthouse and register to vote
when they were worried about eating or having shoes to wear.”6 In coordination with an
expanded voter registration campaign, COFO designed projects to provide education,
health care, and job training to impoverished African Americans across the state. Planned
by SNCC’s Charles Cobb, staff nearly fifty Freedom Schools across the state where
volunteers taught Black history and lessons on civics and the voting process. SNCC’s
Bob Moses and CORE’s Dave Dennis called upon summer project workers to organize
about twenty-nine community centers that offered cultural and educational opportunities
such as job training, adult literacy courses, information about health and child care, and
programs about art and music in many rural areas. 7
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COFO members largely embraced these plans for community empowerment but
debated extensively over the potential role of White volunteers in the summer project.
SNCC members McArthur Cotton, Charlie Cobb, Ivanhoe Donaldson, Hollis Watkins,
and Sam Block worried that northern Whites would supplant local Mississippians’ role in
the movement while Bob Moses, Lawrence Guyot, Fannie Lou Hamer, and Dave Dennis
disagreed and encouraged White participation as a means to help improve race relations
in the United States. Ultimately, COFO invited White, northern liberals as a pragmatic
way to assist the Mississippi Movement as staff realized that no native White doctor and
only a few of Mississippi’s already scant number of Black doctors would treat civil rights
workers. Therefore, the summer project needed northern doctors to come to Mississippi,
while White college students could help garner national attention and ensure a sufficient
number of staff for voter registration work and for operating the Freedom Schools. 8 Yet,
COFO staff agreed that “decisions about the program and techniques in Mississippi were
best made by those who lived and worked there and not by those unfamiliar with the
state.”9
Staff within the COFO alliance, however, voiced concerns over other aspects of
the summer project. NAACP Field Secretary Charles Evers disliked SNCC’s virtual
control over policy-making decisions within COFO. Since only paid staff members from
each parent organization could serve on COFO’s strategy board, approximately forty of
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the seventy members represented SNCC. CORE had ten to fifteen representatives, versus
five to ten members came from the SCLC. As the only officer who drew a salary from
the NAACP, Charles Evers served as that organization’s only voting representative. 10
NAACP Director of Branches Gloster Current worried that “unless we get some clear
understanding as to our role, we are going to lose out in the publicity anyway to other
organizations, and possibly run the risk of being more involved in some aspects than we
care to be.”11 Over these concerns, national officers on May 27 met with Aaron Henry
and Charles Evers of the Mississippi State Conference of Branches to discuss the
NAACP’s role in Freedom Summer. 12
The NAACP’s suspicions were not totally unwarranted. During a training session
for Freedom Summer volunteers on May 25, NAACP staffer Laplois Ashford overheard
accusations by some SNCC members that the NAACP feared losing potential recruits and
publicity and that they would only raise funds for and assist COFO-organized projects if
it garnered them positive media attention. In addition, a COFO handbook, that outlined
organizing strategies for the Mississippi Movement, warned volunteers destined for
Hinds County and the city of Jackson about probable frustrations they might develop
while working with the area’s conservative local leadership and NAACP officials. The
handbook also indicated that “work in Jackson will have to be done within the context of
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building a community base to circumvent the established leadership after the summer.” 13
Tension grew increasingly palpable within the COFO alliance, but its members muted
any disagreements in public and continued preparations to organize Mississippi’s Black
communities. Still, these policy disagreements remained an issue for civil rights activists
while planning for summer activity.
Meanwhile, Charles Payne noted that “as the plans for the summer [of 1964]
evolved, Mississippi officialdom geared up for war.”14 Most state officials and
prominent businessmen, including those in the Sovereignty Commission and in the White
Citizens’ Council, called on southern Whites to refrain from mob violence and instead to
allow law enforcement officials to deal with summer volunteers. 15 James Forman of
SNCC complained about the state legislature’s “constant stream of [new] laws designed
to impede at every turn our efforts to initiate social change.” 16 A “riot control bill”
increased funding for the Mississippi Highway Patrol and allowed its personnel to assist
cities across the state with civil rights related disturbances, while the “anti-invasion” and
“criminal syndicalism” bills criminalized the act of entering the state to violate
Mississippi laws. House Bill 870 outlawed all picketing, with violators facing a fine of up
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to one million dollars or two years in prison. In Jackson, the city council authorized
Mayor Allen Thompson to deputize any person to help quell any demonstrations that
summer. 17
Prominent White Mississippians repudiated Klan violence that might prompt
federal intervention on behalf of civil rights workers but often showed little concern for
violence perpetrated by the state’s penal system. Police accused White CORE member
Richard A. Jewitt of public drunkenness while he ran errands in Jackson on the night of
March 30. An officer interrogated Jewitt about possible connections to communism and
his beliefs concerning interracial dating before assaulting him repeatedly and arresting
him on false charges of resisting arrest and public drunkenness. Found guilty the next
day, Jewitt served two days in the Hinds County jail before being bailed out. 18
On April 16, 1964, Jackson police arrested Eli Hochstedler, a northern White
student, and Marion Gillon, a local Black youth, for attempting to attend a showing of
“Holiday on Ice” together at the Jackson Municipal Auditorium. Convicted the next day
for Breach of the Peace, they were charged five hundred dollars and sentenced to six
months imprisonment. Police placed Hochstedler in a cell where, later that evening, a
dozen inmates entered and threatened to kill him. They forced Hochstedler to strip nude
and lay on a bare metal mattress, where two prisoners then beat him repeatedly with
leather belts. After police moved Hochstedler into another cell the next day, they placed
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another White student in his previous cell, where inmates beat him that night. 19 Even
among other prisoners, civil rights activists did not enjoy equal protection under the law.
By facilitating vigilante violence within prison walls, police exercised yet another
strategy of intimidation against those who violated southern cultural mores.
As the state bolstered its law enforcement agencies, Mississippi’s legislature
increased funding to the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission and White Citizens’
Council branches for investigation and public relations work. Legislators granted
$500,000, the largest allocation of money it had received up to that date, to the
Sovereignty Committee beginning on July 1, 1964. The funding allowed the
Commission to pay its three investigators Tom Scarbrough, Andy Hopkins, Virgil
Downing, a salary of $7,100 dollars a year to compile dossiers on suspected civil rights
workers. Sometimes working in conjunction with each other, Sovereignty Commission
staff and members of the Citizens’ Council frequently canvassed voter registration
meetings to photograph suspected civil rights activists and record their car registration
information for use in later physical and economic retaliation against them. Their efforts
to undermine plans for Freedom Summer extended even beyond the South. Using paid
informants, the Sovereignty Commission obtained membership lists of Freedom Summer
volunteers and investigated training workshops in the North for proof that civil rights
activity was, as according to a WCC pamphlet, “nothing more than a cover-up and a
spearhead for more socialism and communism.” 20

19

Eli Hochstedler, affidavit, Hinds County, Jackson, MS, undated, SNCC Papers,
reel 38, A:XV:95, frame 0097.
20
James Forman to Mr. and Mrs. Henry Michaels, May 19, 1964, SNCC Papers,
reel 7, A=IV=221, frame 0710; Katagiri, The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission,
145-47, 162; White Citizens’ Council, pamphlet, “Racial Facts,” 1964, Citizens’

66
State officials and Sovereignty Committee staff found no such proof but still
attempted to discredit the Freedom Summer operation through a national lecture
campaign designed to convince Americans that Mississippi, with its supposedly
harmonious race relations, was in the midst of an unwarranted, extremist, communistinspired attack. On the floors of Congress, southern representatives openly accused civil
rights activists of attempting to push for radical change through violent means. While
debating a new civil rights act, Mississippi congressmen passed out copies of the Jackson
Advocate, a black-owned newspaper that served as a mouthpiece for segregationists, to
other members of Congress in an attempt to convince them that Black Mississippians
were actually content with the status quo and did not want a civil rights bill. 21
Mississippi’s extensive allocation of personnel and resources to undermining civil rights
activity illustrates the determination of White officials to maintain the status quo.
Although Mississippi officials attempted to distance themselves publically from
the Ku Klux Klan and other vigilante groups, membership in the Klan grew significantly
throughout late 1963 and 1964 from a “gut feeling that the battle for White supremacy
was being lost” and that state leaders seemed unable to preserve segregation. 22 The
number of cross burnings, beatings, and unsolved murders exploded throughout
Mississippi, particularly in the southwest. In Natchez, for example, beginning in
November 1963, a new group known as the Americans for the Preservation of the White
Race (APWR) regularly terrorized black citizens. Despite its calls for law and order,
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Mississippi’s power structure proved unwilling to curb vigilante activity in any
meaningful way, particularly as many Klansmen regularly worked with or for state law
enforcement agencies. Therefore, law enforcement officials and segregationist vigilantes
both stood ready to resist waves of northern volunteers coming down during the summer
of 1964.23
Before the arrival of northern volunteers, COFO established a network of offices
around the state to coordinate civil rights activity. With its executive office in Jackson,
COFO sent staff into all five congressional districts of Mississippi. In the first district,
director Frank Smith led the COFO office in Holly Springs while Donald White
organized activity in Columbus, Willie Blue in Batesville, and Claude Weaver in Tupelo.
Considering the turbulent history of civil rights activity in the Delta, COFO sent a huge
staff into the second congressional district. Director Sam Block worked with Charles
Ray McLaurin in Indianola, Willie Shaw and Matthew Hughes in Belzoni, Willie Smith
and James Jones in Clarksdale, Dickey Flowers in Tunica County, Fannie Lou Hamer in
Ruleville, and Amzie Moore in Cleveland. 24
Director McArthur Cotton in the McComb office, Jessie Harris in Hinds County,
Dick Frey in Natchez, and Dave Greene in Vicksburg organized voter registration work
for the third district. In the fourth district, only director George Greene and William
McGee organized work while director Lawrence Guyot, Carl Arnold, John O’Neal, Jerry
Bray, and Jimmy Lee Prewitt oversaw voter registration work in the fifth district. These
core personnel instructed incoming volunteers, the first wave of whom arrived in mid
23
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June, on properly conducting voter registration work and on how to ensure the overall
safety of project staff. All summer personnel were expected to correspond regularly with
the state office in Jackson and to know the location of safe havens and escape routes in
the communities in which they lived and worked.25 Perhaps most importantly, these
young COFO organizers were instructed to “move at a pace local people dictated and to
respect the mores and beliefs of local communities.”26 The Mississippi Movement wanted
local communities to exercise agency over their own political destinies, so summer staff
worked closely with Black Mississippians to inspire them in forging their own social
institutions for community uplift.
Although COFO established its central office in the capital, the strategy
committee, composed largely of conservative black community members and NAACP
branch staff, organized most civil rights activity within Jackson though they agreed to
cooperate with COFO-outlined efforts to expand voter registration work and to build
momentum for the MFDP. Conservative Black Mississippians and the more militant
community members and staff of SNCC shared a common desire to expand the number
of registered voters and to help Black Mississippians engage meaningfully in the political
process. Throughout June and July, Black Mississippians attempted to participate in
Democratic Party precinct meetings throughout the state, but most were turned away or
whites had secretly changed the meeting place. On the morning of June 23, for example,
forty-two year-old domestic worker and Jackson resident Hazel T. Palmer and fellow poll
watcher Mannie Benson approached the Hinds County nominating convention but were
25
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turned away by the chairman and four white guards. Only a few African Americans
successfully attended meetings, primarily in such larger areas as Greenville and Jackson.
Because the Democratic Party in Mississippi continued to deny African Americans
access to the regular convention meetings, COFO staff continued working to garner
support for the MFDP and its challenge to incumbent White congressmen and to the
state’s delegation to the 1964 national Democratic Party convention. 27
Still, Mississippi staff could celebrate passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
mandated the desegregation of public facilities. Shortly thereafter, a group of national
NAACP officers visited the Magnolia State to test the state’s compliance with the
legislation and to investigate any reports of continued intimidation of African Americans.
Arriving in Jackson on July 5, staff made reservations at the luxurious King Edward
Hotel, the Heidelburg Hotel, and the Sun n’ Sand Motel without incident, as the police
did not wish to solicit negative media attention and possibly prompt federal intervention.
Members of the Citizens’ Council in Jackson, however, called immediately for a boycott
against any White-owned business that served Black customers. Yet, the harsh economic
impact of a sustained, two year-long boycott in the city convinced most Whites not to
boycott, and with pressure from Jackson’s Chamber of Commerce, city officials
begrudgingly urged compliance with the Civil Rights Act. This reinforces historian
David Chappell’s contention that southern Whites increasingly “found themselves
compelled to break with the segregationists in order to restore social peace, a good
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business climate, [and] the good name of their city in the national headlines.” 28 From
July 5 to 8, the NAACP delegation visited Canton, Philadelphia, Meridian, Laurel, Moss
Point, Biloxi, Gulfport and Clarksdale, where they received similarly cool receptions.
During their trip, however, the NAACP delegation learned about numerous instances of
continued discrimination against Mississippi Blacks and therefore demanded federal
intervention into the state to protect the constitutional rights of African Americans.
COFO, however, largely criticized the trip as a publicity stunt that only detracted from
the state-wide voter registration campaign. 29
Dittmer argues that growing tension over funding, publicity, and decision-making,
prompted a “serious division within the [COFO-led] Mississippi Movement [by the
summer of 1964], a split encouraged by the national office of the NAACP.” 30 Indeed,
NAACP national staffer Laplois Ashford lambasted COFO leaders for the occasional
problems in adequately housing volunteers, while Gloster Current demanded continued
relations with the regular Mississippi Democratic Party. National and state NAACP
officers also resented their limited influence over policy formation, particularly since
their organization provided a significant portion of funds to the Mississippi project, even
during a period of financial hardship for the national office. The NAACP understandably
worried about losing agency over its own projects and staff, and on July 1 tapped
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Clarence Laws as the new NAACP regional director for the southwest and liaison to
COFO to reinforce its presence in Mississippi. Yet, the national office of the NAACP
alone did not precipitate growing tension within COFO. Despite their financial
contributions and long record of service in Mississippi, members of SNCC, CORE, and
the SCLC frequently criticized the NAACP’s more conservative approach towards civil
rights activism, a charge NAACP staff heavily resented. Still, even if the four
organizations grew increasingly unsure about the future of allied projects, COFO at least
held firm on its summer project objectives. 31
Meanwhile, in response to the influx of civil rights workers, Mississippi Governor
Paul Johnson and other top state officials continued to worry about possible negative
media attention surrounding White extremists, such as members of the Klan, and warned
them publically not to interfere with police efforts to round up demonstrators. Yet, the
rest of the nation nonetheless learned about countless instances of vigilante-organized
violence and police brutality against summer volunteers. The murders of CORE
members Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, White volunteers from New York,
and Black Mississippian James Chaney, shocked the nation. While investigating the
recent burning of the Mount Zion Methodist Church in Philadelphia, Mississippi, on June
21, local police arrested and held the three men until nightfall. A group of Klansmen
chased the men, when they were released later that night, by car and forced the trio down
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a gravel road where they then shot and buried the men in an earthen dam. FBI agents
found the bodies on August 4.32
Violence erupted around the state throughout the summer, even in Mississippi’s
capital. Two carloads of Whites armed with bricks and bats knocked out the windows of
COFO’s Jackson office on June 2, injuring one person. On June 23, an unidentified
assailant fired shots into the home of local Black businessman and strategy committee
member R.L.T. Smith while other unidentified Whites fired three shots into Henderson’s
Café, hitting a Black man twice in the head and wounding him. The COFO office also
reported the July 6 burning of the McCraven-Hill Missionary Baptist Church, even
though it had no connection to the civil rights movement, and several instances of phone
harassment and random beatings of Black youths and White volunteers in Jackson. 33
While an integrated group of volunteers ate at a drive-in on July 12, White
teenagers slashed the tires of their car and spit in their faces. That same day, an elderly
White man attacked a Black woman at the Greyhound terminal coffee shop. Police
arrested the wounded woman for disturbing the peace, while her attacker escaped. On
July 22, two Whites beat a summer volunteer with clubs at a downtown Jackson
intersection, and on August 4, an unidentified White man chased a local Black volunteer
out of a diner and subsequently drove after him in a truck, firing two shots at him.
Similarly, a White man armed with a pistol chased White student volunteer Mary Zeno
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and local black activist Rommie Drain as they canvassed Black neighborhoods for
potential voters.34
August 15 marked a particularly brutal day for summer volunteers in Jackson. An
unidentified individual beat volunteer Philip Hocker with a baseball bat outside the
COFO office, while at least two integrated carloads of volunteers were shot at. That
night, an individual shot local student Willie Gynes in the leg, and throughout the night,
local Klansmen burned crosses across the city at locations frequented by summer project
staff. Incident reports compiled by the Jackson COFO office also confirmed numerous
instances of brutal treatment within Mississippi’s penal system. On June 27, three White
prisoners beat twenty-three-year-old Edward S. Hollander, a CORE field secretary from
Baltimore, Maryland, in a Hinds County jail. 35
Police routinely arrested or intimidated civil rights workers. On June 25, Jackson
officers arrested eight volunteers for minor traffic charges, most of which they had
fabricated. Other workers were simply detained for several hours or fined and then
released. According to one affidavit, police intercepted Willie Funches and two other
Black youths on their way to the COFO office in Jackson and accused them of having
thrown rocks and bricks at police officers earlier in the day. One officer struck Funches
in the stomach with a nightstick and before allowing the trio to leave, warned them that
“if I catch any of you three in any of the demonstrations I’ll shoot all of you niggers and
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smoke my cigar on top of you and think nothing about it.”36 Police charged a local
Jackson Black volunteer on August 3 with vagrancy for wearing a SNCC button outside a
drugstore near his home and, on August 7, arrested SNCC’s Ivanhoe Donaldson for
possession of an improper driver’s license, though he was not driving at the time. 37
The explosion of violence prompted greater federal attention on the state. With a
FBI field office in Jackson by the end of the summer and continued vigilance by civil
rights activists, White officials in Mississippi, suggested Charles Payne, “could no longer
completely suppress Black activism, but Black activism could make no major dents in the
structure of opposition.”38 While in some municipalities the Klan and local leadership
continued to work together, state officials began purging known Klan members from
police units. Even in Mississippi’s legislature, more moderate members became
increasingly vocal on civil rights issues. Erle Johnson, director of the Sovereignty
Commission and a self-proclaimed “practical segregationist,” recognized the futility of
continued resistance to federal involvement and urged other state officials to comply with
civil rights legislation. On the other hand, William J. Simmons, head of Jackson’s
Citizens’ Council and an ardent segregationist, accused Johnson and other moderates in
the state legislature of “giving up” in the effort to maintain segregation. While racists
held control of high state offices, the freedom struggle successfully created fissures
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within Mississippi’s power structure and in White communities over the future of race
relations. 39
By the end of the summer project, COFO successfully registered sixteen to
eighteen hundred new voters, which the NAACP’s Aaron Henry credited to the work of
each member organization; yet, Black Mississippians still did not enjoy equal protection
under the law or have the means to control their political and economic destinies and so
Bob Moses announced on August 19 that two hundred volunteers, sixty-five SNCC
members, and thirty CORE staff would remain in Mississippi to continue voter
registration work and to maintain community outreach projects. In addition, several
medical, legal, and ministerial groups promised to establish permanent operations in the
state. Efforts, though, primarily shifted towards the MFDP’s challenge of the state’s
regular delegation to the Democratic Party national convention in August. The MFDP
sought recognition as the only legitimate political entity from Mississippi that truly
represented all of the state’s constituents and planned to petition Democratic Party
officials to seat MFDP delegates at the convention instead of Mississippi’s regular allWhite segregationist delegation. 40
Most of the sixty-member MFDP delegation arrived in Atlantic City, New Jersey,
by August 21 and seemed confident that the Credentials Committee would recognize
them as the legitimate representatives of Mississippi. They had considerable reason to
believe so because Mississippi’s regular all-White delegation excluded Blacks, supported
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Republican candidate Barry Goldwater, and often criticized President Lyndon Johnson’s
domestic policies. Unfortunately, President Johnson worried about losing the party’s
southern base of support and heavily pressured the Freedom Democrats to accept a token
compromise to seat only members Aaron Henry and Ed King. The SCLC’s Martin
Luther King., CORE’s James Farmer, and the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins and Aaron Henry
expressed support for the MFDP challenge but urged them to accept the compromise.
Growing increasingly frustrated with the MFDP’s hesitancy, Roy Wilkins suggested that
“you [MFDP members] all are just ignorant…you should just pack your bags up and go
home.”41 Yet, MFDP members lambasted the idea of compromising and, on August 26,
unanimously rejected the offer. In response, President Johnson and his political allies
successfully pressured the Credentials Committee to reject the MFDP’s petition for
gaining Mississippi’s seats.42
In the wake of this defeat, the COFO-led Mississippi Movement underwent a
major transition from fall 1964 into the spring of 1965. Dittmer noted that “Freedom
Summer and the attendant national publicity brought grudging compliance [from much of
the state] with the new civil rights act and the peaceful desegregation of a handful of
students.”43 Yet, Black Mississippians had failed to secure meaningful franchise with
which to empower their lives and communities, while the MFDP’s defeat at the national
convention dealt a blow to the morale of movement veterans, particularly the more
militant SNCC youth. COFO’s Jackson office fell increasingly into disarray while
several staff within the alliance exhibited growing disillusionment and pessimism over
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the future and direction of the freedom struggle. Members questioned whether they
should continue to work with northern White liberals or even with less militant activists
and conservative middle-class Black leaders.44
Tension grew increasingly disruptive within the civil rights alliance. SNCC’s and
CORE’s growing radicalism placed them at greater odds than ever with moderate
national and Mississippi NAACP staff. Although previously muted, SNCC and NAACP
members, in particular, increasingly vented their frustrations about each other publically.
SNCC’s Fannie Lou Hamer resented how largely middle-class NAACP staff like Roy
Wilkins and Gloster Current often belittled the attempts by rural, poor Mississippians to
secure political control over their communities and to address the needs of impoverished
Blacks. Hamer recounted accusations that undereducated Mississippi Blacks lacked
adequate organizing skills. Historian Chana Kai Lee noted that a divergence within
COFO increasingly pitted impoverished Black Mississippians and their militant allies,
who wanted to address the local needs of communities and “felt that the NAACP thought
itself superior and better able to determine what was best for Mississippi,” against largely
middle-class NAACP members, who thought that more militant activists of COFO were
“unappreciative” and “that local people [around Mississippi] only wanted the NAACP
around when local campaigns needed financial or legal support”45
The NAACP furthermore criticized SNCC’s apparent takeover of most local
projects in Mississippi, particularly in rural areas. NAACP members grumbled that
“policy and execution in COFO are [increasingly] outside [the] command” of the
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NAACP and many seemed convinced that individuals within the alliance were “definitely
anti-NAACP” and “wanted to see it destroyed.” 46 C.C. Bryant of the Pike County
chapter in McComb complained that SNCC staff usually ignored the NAACP’s advice
when discussing project plans and often treated them rudely. Bryant and R.L.T. Smith of
the Jackson branch suggested that the NAACP State Conference of Branches revitalize its
own voter registration program, separate from COFO. 47 Gloster Current even expressed
his confidence that the organization could operate its voter registration programs more
effectively on its own and suggested that “in the end we can be responsible for our own
program and mistakes.”48
Tension between Mississippi staff of the NAACP and other COFO members
came to a breaking point in November 1964. On November 8, 1964, the NAACP’s
Mississippi State Conference of Branches finally requested permission from the national
office to break all relations with the COFO alliance. Only Aaron Henry had spoken in
favor of continuing relations with COFO, but he stayed loyal to the NAACP and voted
with his fellow members. Mississippi’s NAACP staff expressed a willingness to
continue efforts to work within the political machinery of the Democratic Party that few
other COFO members shared. The national office, however, deferred its decision over
whether to break away from the alliance until it had met with the heads of SNCC, CORE,
and the SCLC and had thoroughly considered the implications of such action. In the
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meantime, the national office continued to receive reports from field staff that SNCC
virtually controlled COFO and did not consult with the other members of COFO
concerning policy decisions, which was particularly irksome since the NAACP had
funded so much of the Mississippi Movement, including $380,000 in bail money during
the 1963 demonstrations.49
As rumors spread about the NAACP’s possible split from COFO, Benjamin
McAddo, a long time financial contributor, threatened to stop donating to the NAACP if
it pulled out of COFO. Maurice Wheeler, father of a Mississippi volunteer, urged the
NAACP to continue working with the other organizations involved, as “they [COFO]
need the financial support of the NAACP and the strength of its name, as well as the
advice and counsel of the experienced people in the NAACP. 50 Roy Wilkins informed
McAddo that the national office had not yet made its decision on whether to cut ties with
COFO, and more importantly, Wilkins explained that Mississippi staff had requested
permission to break away from COFO. The national office had not, as many Americans
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assumed at the time, forced the Mississippi State Conference of Branches to reconsider
its future in the alliance but mulled over the possible implications of such a break. 51
Regardless of growing split within COFO, MFDP members continued their
struggle for political power. Because all MFDP candidates lost their Democratic Party
primary elections earlier in the spring and state officials refused to allow them to run in
the November 1964 state election as Democrats and as a result five MFDP candidates
collected signatures to run as independents. When the signatures were turned over to the
state election commission, however, the commission claimed that none of the candidates
had acquired the necessary number of signatures. Only later did the MFDP find proof
that state officials had thrown away a number of signatures. In protest, another Freedom
Vote ballot on November 3 pitted Harold Ruby against First District Representative
Thomas Abernathy, Fannie Lou Hamer in the Second District against Representative
Jamie Whitten, Annie Devine against Arthur Winstead in the Fourth District, Victoria
Jackson Gray against Fifth District Representative William Colmer, and Aaron Henry,
who later dropped out, against Senator John Stennis. 52 Results from the protest vote were
were opposite of the state’s official election results, which proved that continued
existence of discriminatory voting practices by Mississippi officials. The MFDP
therefore filed legal briefs in early 1965 against the state to challenge the legitimacy of
the congressional election results. 53
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As COFO increasingly unraveled over the spring of 1965, many of the more
militant Mississippi veterans drifted into Louisiana and Alabama throughout the spring of
1965 to establish new local projects, while most COFO workers who remained in the
state joined the MFDP. SNCC’s Bernard Lafayette, who had organized activity in
Jackson and Laurel, Mississippi, established a voter registration project in Selma,
Alabama, during February. In conjunction with Martin Luther King, Jr. and a SCLC
project started in January, staff led numerous attempts to register African Americans in
the city. After repeated failures, civil rights workers decided to garner national attention
to continued voting discrimination in Alabama by protesting the recent murder of Jimmie
Lee Jackson by an Alabama state trooper. Martin Luther King planned to lead a march
from Selma to the state capital of Montgomery, starting on March 7, to publicly denounce
Alabama’s denial of meaningful Black suffrage. Media officials filmed how police
intercepted the marchers and beat them savagely on the Edmund Pettus Bridge, gateway
to Montgomery. When the rest of the nation learned that White vigilantes had beaten
Boston native Reverend James J. Reeb, who died of his injuries, President Lyndon
Johnson on March 15 publicly called for Congress to pass a voting rights bill and
pressured Alabama Governor George Wallace to ensure the safe passage of Selma
marchers to Montgomery. Arriving successfully on March 21, Martin Luther King
reiterated his demand for voting rights legislation. 54
Back in Mississippi, newly appointed MFDP chairman Lawrence Guyot and
militant local youth helped twenty-two Black citizens of Jackson attempt voter
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registration on “Freedom Day” March 15, 1965. Thirty police and an armored riot car,
however, met the crowd and ordered them all to leave. In response, group members
retrieved picket signs from their cars and were subsequently arrested and given thirty-day
sentences in prison. Conservative Black community leaders and NAACP branch
members including R.L.T Smith and Charles Evers did not seem keen on joining these
demonstrations. Jackson NAACP branch files concerning activity during the spring and
summer of 1965 reveal very little action other than tentative plans for another voter
registration campaign that summer. It reasonably stands that the NAACP and its allies in
Jackson, less militant than the MFDP, supported voter registration work and building
support for a proposed voter rights act but remained highly hesitant over the prospect of
provoking violent backlash from White authorities via demonstrations, particularly since
the Jackson Movement’s original goals had been achieved by the summer of 1965. 55
After lengthy debate during the spring of 1965, the NAACP’s national office
approved on April 13, 1965, the Mississippi Conference of Branches’ request to
withdraw from COFO. In a public statement, officials cited a “long-established policy
against continuing and permanent affiliation of any kind with organizations over which
the NAACP exercises no control” and further explained that “the Board had never
authorized or approved affiliation of the Mississippi branches with COFO.” 56 Dittmer
wrote that the NAACP’s withdrawal “was not fatal, but it accelerated COFO’s decline,
coming as it did at a time when movement leaders themselves were questioning COFO’s
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relevance now that the MFDP was emerging as the major voice of the movement in the
state.”57 Although staff did not officially dissolve COFO until late July, Dittmer suggests
that most activists now recognized that the umbrella organization had effectively
“outlived its usefulness.”58 Most SNCC and CORE members moved into Alabama and
Louisiana or to urban areas of the North and West to help organize community-led
projects while individuals who remained in Mississippi largely joined the MFDP.
By the summer of 1965, Jackson city officials employed twelve Black officers
and ten crossing guards, while several White-owned businesses had begun hiring office
workers and regularly addressed Black and White customers with courtesy titles. Bus
stations, railroad stations, and airports were all desegregated, as well as most hotels and
eating establishments. Also, members of Jackson’s Black community now regularly
communicated with city officials, and during the spring, thirty eight Black students had
attended previously all-White schools without incident. Despite hesitation from the
NAACP, MFDP staff showed no such hesitation and demanded that Mississippi officials
address continuing problems with irregular voting practices, unequal access to viable
employment, housing, healthcare, and rampant police brutality against African
Americans. Although initiated and largely sustained up to this point by the NAACP and
members of Jackson’s black community, the MFDP now held the reins of the Jackson
Movement.59
In an effort to undermine the moral authority of the MFDP, however, Governor
Paul Johnson called Mississippi’s legislature into session during mid-June to repeal
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discriminatory voting laws, including the constitutional interpretation and good character
requirements. Dittmer attributes Johnson’s sudden change in policy to a plan designed to
place Mississippi’s voting laws on relative standing with other states in order to challenge
the anticipated Voting Rights Act in court. Yet, because of voter discrimination during
the November 1964 election, MFDP members did not view current state officials as
legitimate representatives and therefore dismissed the validity of any action taken by
special session. Instead, the MFDP called for demonstrations at the state capitol to
provoke congressional action in upholding voting rights laws. 60
On the morning of June 14, 1965, MFDP chair Lawrence Guyot led five hundred
demonstrators out of the Morning Street Baptist Church for a silent, mile-long march to
the state Capitol. Nearly half were in their teens, and about seventy-five were recentlyarrived White volunteers from outside the South. Halfway to the Capitol building, police
intercepted the marchers, savagely beat many of them, and arrested four hundred and
eighty-two for parading without a permit. Guyot called immediately for an explosion of
protest activity in Jackson, and answering the call, 859 marchers were jailed by the end of
the first week.61
Dittmer recognized that, sadly, accounts confirmed that “a ritualized pattern of
police brutality bordering on torture emerged from the fairgrounds compound [as] female
prisoners were subjected to lewd and suggestive remarks, including promises of release
in return for sexual favors,” while officers armed with batons beat several men’s
genitals. 62 Most were denied medicine and treatment for their injuries or illnesses. State

60

Dittmer, Local People, 344.
Dittmer, The Good Doctors, 103.
62
Ibid., 104.
61

85
and local officials, of course, denied any wrongdoing. Compounding these problems,
with little public brutality against the marchers media sources quickly lost interest in
events in Jackson and what little bond money the MFDP had available quickly dried up.
Most Jackson clergymen were not particularly supportive of Guyot’s rationale for the
march nor were they in the mood to deal with harsh penal conditions at this time and
subsequently stayed away from the demonstrations. The Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals eventually enjoined the city from arresting demonstrators but not before police
had 1,028 individuals in custody. Of those arrested between June 14 and June 30, 603
were adults and 425 were youths. The Justice Committee investigated reports of brutal
treatment within the fairgrounds, but did little else. 63
Dittmer pointed out that “Guyot’s attempt to re-create the Selma campaign in
Jackson had failed despite the hundreds of people who voluntarily went to jail.” 64 The
MFDP could not provoke federal officials to protect the marchers, nor did it prompt
Congress to pass voter rights legislation with any greater urgency. Moderate Black
community members, state officials, and the federal government had seemingly
recognized the inevitability of a voting rights act becoming law and did little to aid
demonstrators in their cause. Furthermore, the June demonstrations largely lacked the
moral authority of the Selma campaign. The little media attention given to the
demonstrations captured only a few images of police brutality, and no mob beatings or
murders occurred to shock the rest of the nation into action as in Selma.
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In early July, a few peaceful marches occurred in Jackson without incident, but no
longer confident of securing further concessions by the state government, the MFDP
stopped demonstrating in Mississippi and instead focused on its political challenge in
Washington D.C. Meanwhile, Mississippi’s legislature repealed the state’s
discriminatory voting laws, and within a month President Johnson signed into law the
Voting Rights Act, which suspended discriminatory voter registration practices such as
literacy tests and sent federal registrars into southern states to ensure compliance.
Despite extensive testimony and evidence proving voter discrimination in Mississippi,
the Congressional Subcommittee on Elections and Privileges recommended in September
the dismissal of MFDP’s challenge to November 1964 election results, which Congress
subsequently voted to do.65
With the NAACP’s new Field Secretary Charles Evers, the Jackson Movement
sustained boycott activity into 1964 while the COFO alliance broadened voter
registration activity across Mississippi. COFO organized the MFDP as a political
challenge to the state’s segregationist power structure but its failure to unseat the state’s
regular Democratic Party accelerated growing tensions within the COFO alliance.
Disputes over policy decisions ultimately culminated in the dissolution of COFO. By the
end of summer 1965, President Lyndon Johnson had signed into law the Civil Rights and
Voting Rights Acts, which essentially ensured unfettered access to public institutions and
services, as well as dismantled most barriers to voting throughout the United States. Yet,
African Americans in the South and elsewhere continued to deal with negative
stereotypes, the omnipresent threat of police brutality, and institutionalized racism
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concerning equitable access to housing, medical care, education, and employment. Since
Jackson officials had conceded to most original demands of the Jackson Movement, most
of the community seemed unwilling to engage in continued militant protest activity as in
other parts of Mississippi and in America.
In the years following 1965, various groups of Black Americans attempted to
help their communities internalize a more positive self-image and to empower themselves
for self-reliance apart from political leaders and the federal government. Nevertheless,
the bourgeoning Black Power Movement in the United States sparked a growing chasm
between activists promoting continued change and moderates, including those in the
federal government. Distraught over increasingly militant demands, federal officials,
White liberals, and conservative Black Mississippians no longer recognized the moral
authority of the continuing freedom struggle for African Americans’ self determination
and precipitated a vicious campaign to undermine any perception of legitimacy for
further activism.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
I don’t see any American Dream…I see an American Nightmare
—Malcolm X
Woe to those who make unjust laws, to those who issue oppressive
decrees, to deprive the poor of their rights and withhold justice from the
oppressed of my people, making widows their prey and robbing the
fatherless.
—Isaiah 10: 1-2
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and
other professional civil rights organizations emerged during the twentieth century in an
effort to secure social and economic advancement for African Americans, and by the
1950s and 1960s, had made considerable gains in several cities. In Jackson, Mississippi,
a grassroots community-driven civil rights movement coalesced in 1955 with a petitiondrive designed to pressure city officials to integrate public schools in compliance with the
1954 Brown decision. Although not successful at the time, members of the Black
community and NAACP branch staff soon initiated a voter registration project and
boycotts against discriminatory White-owned businesses. They were joined in 1961 by
civil rights activists from outside Mississippi, who helped foment a wave of nonviolent
protests and primed Jackson’s Black community for widespread civil rights activity for
1963. By the summer of 1963, NAACP officers and Jackson’s conservative African
Americans convinced most Black community members to accept concessions by city
officials that only partially fulfilled original movement demands. Undeterred, several of
the more militant youth and activists sustained the Jackson Movement and, within a
month, were joined again by Black conservatives when city officials proved unwilling to
fulfill their compromise obligations.
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Meanwhile, the reformed Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) began
mobilizing Mississippi’s Black communities to challenge the state’s segregationist power
structure and thereby enable greater control over their political and economic destinies.
Although COFO members first attempted to work within the traditional political
machinery of the Democratic Party, its refusal to allow meaningful participation in the
political process prompted movement personnel to form an alternative political institution
known as the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), which worked to replace
the state’s segregationist governor and congressional leaders. Yet, tension within COFO
grew increasingly problematic due to disagreements over funding and policy formation,
particularly questions over the extent and means by which movement activists would
address continuing social and economic problems in Black communities. Disillusioned
by compromise efforts that fell short of their original goals during the 1964 National
Democratic Party Convention, militant activists and impoverished Black Mississippians
grew less willing to work with the federal government, White northern liberals, and
Black conservatives, including NAACP members.
On the other hand, conservative Black Mississippians who exhibited a preference
for slower-paced social change continued their efforts to expand the number of registered
voters and to attempt working within the political mechanisms of the state’s regular
Democratic Party. In Jackson, conservative community members such as businessman
I.S. Sanders and clergyman Rev. R.L.T. Smith as well as the NAACP staff, led by Field
Secretary Charles Evers, increasingly diverged from the radicalizing Mississippi
Movement led largely by the MFDP. By the summer of 1965, southern governments,
including Jackson’s White leadership, largely had dismantled segregated public facilities
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and most overtly discriminatory voting policies. Few politicians continued openly to
challenge the authority of the federal government. Jackson city officials had even begun
slowly integrating some schools and hired a number of new Black employees.
Historian Harvard Sitkoff argues convincingly that most Americans had
“accepted the civil rights gains of the first half of the decade as necessary and just.”1 Yet,
into the late 1960s, some Black Americans across the country still sought “to address the
debilitating political and economic subjugation that continued to plague [them] after the
passage of civil rights legislation in 1960, 1964, and 1965.”2 Increasingly embittered by
government officials who seemed unresponsive to their needs and who continued to
protect White privilege, many Blacks, particularly those of the lower classes, decided no
longer to rely primarily on the largess of government, but rather began organizing their
own social institutions that could provide adequate food, affordable housing, viable
employment, decent health care, and protection from police brutality.
In June 1965, the MFDP, which had become the leading agent for change in
Mississippi since COFO dissolved that April, organized demonstrations in Jackson
demanding social justice and an end to continued voting irregularities. Complicating the
situation, however, Jackson’s Black community had largely secured the movement’s
original goals of dismantling discriminatory service and employment practices. With
scant support from Black conservatives in the community and NAACP officials, the
protests yielded little except numerous arrests. In the following months and years,
Mississippi’s Black conservatives and NAACP officials, namely State President Aaron
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Henry and Field Secretary Charles Evers, grew increasingly alarmed by the growing
radicalism of the Mississippi Movement and the broader American Civil Rights
Movement. Yet, also simultaneously critical of intransigent White Mississippi
politicians, Black conservatives joined with White moderates to forge a political alliance
that could undercut both extremes and therefore began to shift the state’s Democratic
Party more into alignment with the mainstream national party. Through the political
process, Black conservatives and White moderates sought to address social and economic
problems that plagued all Mississippians.
In July 1965, State President of Mississippi’s AFL-CIO Claude Ramsey invited
more than 100 moderate Whites and Black conservatives, including editor of the DeltaDemocrat Times Hodding Carter III and the NAACP’s Aaron Henry and Charles Evers,
to form a group known as the Loyalist Mississippi Democrats. Working-class individuals,
including sharecroppers, domestic servants, and day laborers, were not invited to join.
With strong backing by the NAACP and black businessmen, the Loyalist Democrats,
officially known as the Mississippi Democratic Conference (MDC), lobbied President
Johnson for recognition as a legitimate political body, but to placate Mississippi
congressmen and to retain his southern base of political support, Johnson refused.
Furthermore, White Mississippians largely withheld support because of MDC’s close
association with the labor movement, while most African Americans preferred to side
with the MFDP. Undeterred, in August 1965, members of the MDC organized a group
known as the Mississippi Young Democrats to mobilize young political moderates in the
state. MFDP members attempted to elect its members into leadership positions of the
Young Democrats, but the national party recognized only former MDC members and

92
their allies as legitimate.3 Although it initially failed to unseat the state’s racist delegation
within the National Democratic Party, the MDC/Young Democrats political entity
succeeded in undermining the MFDP. Black conservatives and White moderates
continued over the late 1960s to work towards exercising greater influence in the
Democratic Party, presumably to improve the lives of all Mississippians, but in reality
they sought to address the needs of middle-class Mississippians to the detriment of
impoverished African Americans and wealthy White racists.
Meanwhile, militant Mississippians, primarily impoverished African Americans
and their allies of the MFDP and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
increasingly sought to secure their conception freedom, or control over their social and
economic destinies, by forging new social institutions independent of white liberals and
intransigent state politicians. Historian Chana Kai Lee wrote that ardent SNCC organizer
Fannie Lou Hamer believed in “self-determination [or] the notion that an oppressed
community should express its collective ability to direct its own destiny” and, therefore,
helped organize several self-reliance projects in impoverished Mississippi Delta
communities. 4 Inspired by the organizing efforts of Hamer, SNCC and the MFDP, fortyfive cotton day laborers, domestic servants, and tractor drivers in April 1965 formed the
Mississippi Freedom Labor Union in the Delta community of Shaw. Members went on
strike throughout that year to demand a minimum hourly wage of $1.25, sick pay, health
and accident insurance, and working conditions equal to those of whites. As in other
instances of civil rights protest activity, Klan members and White businessmen
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intimidated, fired, or attacked protesters. With the onset of winter in 1965 and lacking
food, clothing, money, and shelter, most members left the Freedom Labor Union, which
subsequently dissolved, and returned to White-owned plantations in order to stave off
starvation for them and their families. 5
Although linked to President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” the Child
Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM) represented a major attempt at communitydriven uplift. Sargent Shriver, head of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO),
directed federal funding to CDGM, which enabled local community members and MFDP
veterans to provide a preschool education, two hot meals a day, and healthcare to
impoverished Black youths as part of the bourgeoning federal Head Start Project. By the
start of the first session in July 1965, eighty-four centers served fifty-six hundred youth.
Unfortunately, like other individuals involved with community uplift, individuals
associated with CDGM experienced economic reprisals, police harassment, and Klan
intimidation. 6
A more serious threat to CDGM, however, came from Mississippi leaders and
federal officials themselves. Dittmer explains convincingly that, “unable to keep the
poverty program out of Mississippi, White leaders moved to control [the allocation of
funds].”7 Leroy Percy, a wealthy Delta planter, and Owen Cooper, an industrialist,
formed an alternative non-profit corporation for poverty-education programs called
Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc (MAP). Its twelve-man board, including White
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moderates such as Hodding Carter and the NAACP’s Charles Evers and Aaron Henry,
lobbied the OEO successfully to shift funds away from the CDGM over to MAP centers.
OEO officials were under pressure by Lyndon Johnson to placate Senator John Stennis, a
ranking member of the Senate Appropriation Committee that controlled funding for the
War on Poverty and the Vietnam War, who denounced the CDGM as radical and
inefficient. Soon after, OEO furthermore ordered all Head Start funds and personnel
transferred to MAP centers. Although CDGM limped along for a few years, it finally
dissolved in December 1967, and, as a final insult, President Johnson in 1968 severely
slashed Head Start and other anti-poverty programs in Mississippi to secure further funds
for the Vietnam War. 8
In the broader Civil Rights Movement of the late 1960s, efforts by urban northern
and western Black communities to address continuing powerlessness, now assisted by
staff from the increasingly radicalized SNCC and the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE), also prompted a severe backlash from white communities and the federal
government. Protesting substandard housing, unmet demands for meaningful
employment, and protection from police brutality, several race riots, starting with the
August 1965 Watts riot in Los Angeles, broke out in northern and western urban centers
from 1965 to1968. Yet, instead of prompting the government to alleviate the conditions
within urban ghettos, political and civic leaders decried the rioting as lawlessness and
ordered police to quell the uprisings. By the spring of 1966, most SNCC and CORE staff
were utterly distrustful of the federal government and such moderate civil rights
organizations as the NAACP. Members increasingly criticized President Johnson,
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particularly over his handling of the Vietnam War, and openly rejected nonviolence and
integration as viable strategies for community-led social uplift.9
Back in Mississippi, the tenuous relationship between moderate and militant civil
rights activists weakened further over the emergence of the Black Power ethos.
Beginning on June 4, 1966, University of Mississippi graduate James Meredith began a
march from Memphis to Jackson in an effort to inspire other Black Mississippians to
overcome their fears and to assert their right to vote. The next day, and only ten miles
into his march, Klansman Aubrey James Norvell emerged from some bushes and shot
Meredith in his back with a load of birdshot, wounding him. The NAACP’s Roy
Wilkins, Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC), and the newly appointed chairmen Floyd McKissick of CORE and Stokely
Carmichael of SNCC, quickly agreed to continue the Meredith March Against Fear. Yet,
Carmichael and McKissick wanted to use the march as a platform to criticize the Johnson
administration for its limited intervention into the continuing social and economic
problems that plagued Black communities, much to the chagrin of King and Wilkins.
After marchers stopped in Greenwood on June 16 to pitch their tents for the night,
Carmichael ignored police demands not to do so and was arrested. Before a large rally
that night, Carmichael forcefully and repeatedly called for the crowd to demand “Black
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Power.” On June 26, marchers reached Jackson where 15,000 demonstrators and
Jackson’s Black community heard speeches from major leaders that afternoon. 10
Historian Clayborne Carson identified “Black Power” as a political slogan that
combined a “racial term that previously held negative connotations with a goal that
always had been beyond the reach of Black people as a group.”11 Intentionally
ambiguous as a concept, the “Black Power” ethos quickly pervaded the culture of
impoverished Black communities and helped to inspire black Americans to take pride in
their racial identity and aroused their political consciousnesses to demand control over
their communities. Yet, Dittmer points out that “White Americans quickly came to see
Black Power as a threat” and increasingly refused to accept their struggle as a legitimate
struggle for freedom.12 Anti-White connotations of Black Power reinforced anxieties
among White Americans that “racial equality would come at the expense of the safety of
[their] neighborhoods and schools [and] the security of [their] jobs and homes.”13
Furthermore, criticism of capitalism and the Vietnam War undercut support from the
federal government, which increasingly worked to erode the legitimacy of the continuing
Black struggle by labeling activists as radicals and by arresting many of them. 14
Harvard Sitkoff suggests convincingly that “Black Power, like the [race] riots,
brought important psychological gains for Blacks at the cost of further polarizing the
races, sanctioning the cult of violence, and fueling the White backlash.” 15 Unlike their
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counterparts in 1964, officials presiding over the 1968 Democratic National Convention
agreed not to seat any segregationist delegation and invited an integrated coalition of
Whites, NAACP delegates, and MFDP members to serve as Mississippi’s official
delegation, but after the convention, party leaders purged MFDP members from any
remaining leadership positions within the Democratic Party. 16 America’s White power
structure had gradually dismantled most overt barriers to the franchise, allowed for
unfettered use of public facilities and services, and created new employment
opportunities for Black Americans; but together with Black moderates, it did not feel
compelled to ensure meaningful social justice for impoverished Black communities and,
therefore, limited the pace of social change.
This study examined the civil rights movement in Jackson, Mississippi, as an
extended historical process. By not focusing largely on the most turbulent and wellpublicized periods of civil rights protest, scholars can gain a more complicated
understanding of how grassroots movements shift over time. Similarly, racial identity did
not dictate exclusively how White and Black Mississippians responded to the unfolding
Civil Rights Movement. Conflicting and shifting motivations shaped the nature, extent,
and pace by which Black and Whites challenged or protected status quo discrimination.
As such, the Jackson Movement began as early as 1955 and continued into the 1960s,
eventually securing most of its original demands, but class interests increasingly limited
the pace of social change in Jackson and in the broader Mississippi Movement.
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